Officers of the Handschar Division

An interesting photograph of the division’s German leadership. It shows that the infantry officers often opted to war the feldgrau version which was more tactical. Various camouflage caps, side caps and the SS Bergmutze were also worn instead of the fez.

Officer Ranks and Commands:
SS-Untersturmfuhrers (often brand new out of training) could be expected to lead platoons
SS-Obersturmfuhrers were company level officers in the division
SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer, rank of a company commander who was also capable and known to take over as a battalion commander.
SS-Sturmbannfuhrer, tradition rank of a battalion commander. Also appointed to the leadership of a kampfgruppe.
SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer, most often were regimental commanders

One exceptional company commander was Hans Konig, who as an Obersturmfuhrer had his own battalion (I/28 from 4 Oct 1944 to late Nov 1944). One action that must’ve lead to his battlefield promotion in command was his successful ambush at Vukosavci. His 9th Company annihilated the 17th Majevica Brigade. It’s commander left in such a hurry that he forgot his own pack (in which were found maps and plans for future operations).
Although Sauberzweig was deeply admired by the men of the division, he was replaced as division commander by Desiderius Hampel on the 19th of June 1944. Born in Bosnia to German parents, he not only spoke the language, but shared many things in common with other WW1 officers that were now fighting their second world war. Starting as a platoon commander in the spring of 1915, he quickly rose to the positiopn of deputy battalion commander. From 1937, he served with the Hungarian and Croatian armies when eventually transferred over to the Waffen SS in the may of 1942. He assumed command of SS-Regt 27 at Neuhammer. Hampel would inherit the division on the 19th of june 1944, as Sauberzweig would be promoted to IX Waffen-Gebirgs Korps der SS (Kroatisches) leadership.

Aside from the Imams, who were also commissioned officers, there were atleast nine mountain infantry officers of the Bosnian background serving with the 13th Division. There was also a handful of SS officers of the Croatian descent in the beginning but their numbers fell through desertion. The highest ranking among the Bosnians was SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Husein Beg-Biscevic. Like many of the officers and NCOs he was a soldier (and in any case, an officer) in the Austro-Hungarian Army during WW1. Serving in the famed BH KuK regiments that distinguished themselves so well on all fronts. Many things had changed however, they were no longer in the youths. Biscevic was in command of the Flak battalion 13 from August of ’43 to March of ’44 and eventually replaced for not being aggressive enough.

Muhamed Hadziefendic, the leader of the local Muslim anti partisan unit in Tuzla, was given the rank of Sturmbannfuhrer, and would’ve executed his duties with alot of experience if he had lived to see the day. He was killed in the months before the division finished training and returned. A number of the Imams and officers stayed with the division till the end, some were killed in the spring of 1945, weeks before the war’s end.

The Combat Load-out of a Battalion Commander

This particular Sturmbannfuhrer is a full SS member, which is indicated by the Sig Runes below his left breast pocket. German SS officers who were old enough also fought in WW1. They were in the early 50s now.

This load-out was common to the lowest Untersturmfuhrer. Whose primary weapon was almost always an MP40, as they were expected to lead from the front. Higher ranking officers such as regimental commanders or staff officers settle for pistols when working well behind the lines with posted guards. Machine pistols were a priority in this case for those in immediate danger. Bergmann M-34s were used by NCOs and officers of the ill-fated battery that defended Lopare.
Although the red fez was most synonymous with the Imams, and officers on ceremonial occasions. Which is likely what this Sturmbannfuhrer was portrayed to be on, considering his lack of any field gear.

The Imam-Officers

The imams were mostly primary school teachers recruited by the Ulema in Sarajevo. Most had prior military experience with the Royal Yugoslavian Army (as clerics). Some had even studied religion in Cairo and Alexandria. They were described (by the Germans) as very intelligent (many were bi/tri-lingual) but not fanatical or fundamentalist. They were well politically informed but their goals, loyalties and motivations varied from man to man. The most senior of them (once they were comissioned) was Abdullah Muhasilovic (former Yugo Army) was appointed Divisions-imam.

In battle they were described as everything from lethargic to fanatical. Ahmed Skaka (I/28) was even recommended the Iron Cross for battlefield heroism. He moved to Australia following the war to avoid Yugoslavian persecution. He arrived on 26. Jan 1950 but the official records said nothing of an SS officer, rather as an inmate of Stalag 17 (Bosnia).

The Imam Training Course

 

Battles of Apatin and Batina

November 1944

First large scale engagements of the division outside of Bosnia (previous to this only smaller abteilung detachments fought while augmented out to other Wehrmacht frontline units).
The Apatin and Batina bridgeheads were just northeast of Brcko, Bosnia. Still in near vicinity of the division’s old area of operations.

Another honorable mention of SS-Obstuf. Konig

A “rescue” by the 118th Jager Division

A Summary of the division’s positions by Dec 2nd 1944

A spotlight on one of Regt 27’s own.

An evaluation of the 98 Karabiner:

 

Mausers were still seeing service amongst all belligerents of the 90s Balkan wars. Often alongside its companion the MG42 (re-designated the M53 LMG). Tito’s own hunting lodge in Bugojno fell victim to the looting (which is where I’m assuming this antiquated Mauser rifle came from). The militiaman on the right has his AK47 slung as his brandishes a Mauser that bears Czech features.

Heavy fighting in Hungary subsided after the defense of Haromfa by the Germans (7-13. Dec.) With the exception of the New Years Attack and that of the Bulgarians on the 11th (both repelled by II/27) one could almost say ‘all was quiet on the eastern front.’ German forces on the Hungarian front reported “hardly any fighting at all” until Op. Spring Awakening. The only exception was in the area of Csurgo and Nagyatad where elements of Kpfgpe. Hanke moved in to cover the withdrawal of the 71st Wehr. Div. That sector kept the Germans busy all winter long.

An Assault at Heresznye

Death Card of Georg Wirkert (Division member): aged 26 from Inzing, Tyrol (now Austria). Holder of the EKII, wound and Bandenkampfer badges.

 

The Collapse of the Eastern Front – South after Fruhlingserwachen

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Allied Air Activity late 1944

5. November 1944:
“as they approached the target, a large cloud formation appeared over the target. Lt Col. Hardy did a 360 deg. turn and led his small formation around the edges of the cloud cover but was unable to find an openning through which to attack the target.”

7. November 1944:
“Target: Ali Pasin Most Marshalling Yard near Sarajevo, Yugoslavia (allied map)

The target for Mission 130 of 7 November was the Ali Pasin Most Marshalling Yard, Yugoslavia. This target was of high priority at the time, it was attacked because of the use the Germans were making of it in their withdrawal from Greece. Because of the military importance of the target and because of the fact the target was bombed visually, it was a great disappointment to the group to almost completely miss it. The intense and heavy flak defending this target hit 16 of the 24 planes in the formation and wounded one man.”

The mission was lauded as a success depite the groups poor performance. They claimed that the “Sarajevo arms repair work shops, gas works, engine house, railway works and shops destroyed or severly damaged. At Ali Pasin Most railway: 6 locomotives destroyed and station heavily damaged.” Between Derventa and Doboj, 3 locomotives were claimed to have been destroyed, along with one armored train. The 1st Ustasa regiment in Sarajevo was claimed to have been wiped out.

Dec. 3rd 1944 attempt was cancelled.

 

A worsening situation

Behind the scenes of the fighting

About a month ago, Turkey broke off all diplomatic relations with the Reich, and a week ago Romania switched sides. The Red Army is coming towards the Croatian state even faster now. During the first 20 days of September, over 2,000 men have deserted, having only served so distinguishably weeks prior.
During the same 20 days in September, the predominantly Muslim town of Tuzla fell to the partisans and the 12th Ustasa Brigade switches sides.

Early Desertions

At first it was only the Catholic Croats, Seeing as how it was an overly Muslim oriented division under draconian SS leadership, a huge number simply deserted. Many left simply because they were the minority others because of the professional level of discipline that was exemplified and enforced by the German officers. Many including the latter Muslims deserters went back to their old positions in the Ustasa, Zeleni Kader, Domobran because of the more relaxed athmosphere and overall lower discipline.
In case of the Catholic Croats, less than 300 out of the original 2,800 remained by April 1944.
They were re-organized, taken out of the infantry battalions and put into the Feldgendarm Trupp. In an effort to contain their negative influence on the Muslims.
To sum it up, it was a division Himmler wanted, the Croats opposed, and the Bosnians saw as their last hope.
Prior to the division’s movement into Bosnia, Tito knew he could not match it in the field. For this he made up by offering amnesty every time a huge blow was struck to the Axis on the eastern front. Finally when timing was right, he would benefit from Handschar’s disintegration in ways more than one. The damage he inflicted through this political tactic was many time larger than what he could’ve hoped to achieve by sending an entire partisan corps against 13. SS.
From the Bosnian perspective, once the Germans gave the order to march out of Bosnia, this wasn’t their world war anymore. Many of their German comrades sympathized with them for deserting.

Handschar would also make Tito re-think how he treated the Muslim component of his post war country.
During the war, Muslims made up an obscured figure and lacked representation in the leadership of the partisan circles.

The comments made by some German officers concerning Handschar’s purpose as a “political instrument” proved to be a dead on description in 1944 and it’s still accurate today, as it is still used for various propaganda purposes.

Where are the deserters going?

Operating Group Una spring 1944

This picture shows a collection of different uniforms, possibly denoting where these fighters came from.
From left to right, you can see Domobran/Ustasa, Wehrmacht, British (partisan), and M43 SS tunics.
The Rifleman on the far right is defiantly one of the 146 Muslim deserters that left the division in the 7. April-15 June time period. He exhibits many of the give aways of a former Gebirgsjager. K98 rifle, Bergschuhe, M43 SS uniform (complete) and cartridge pouches.
The man on the road guiding the pack mule has a typical look of someone fresh out of basic training. Blouse with removed pockets is another feature unique to uniforms from the Handschar Div.
The big difference here is headgear. Some have gone back to the shorter red Domobran/Ustasa fez while others wear the SS side cap with insignia removed. Belt buckles are another indicator. Insignia patches are missing for a good reason.
If there are indeed former SS men from 13. SS in this column, they deserted having found out the division wasn’t going to operate in western Bosnia. The chances of this group running into a bunch of dead SS-Gebirgsjagers from Prinz Eugen and taking their uniforms and equipment are low.

Huska’s Renegades and other factions

Another fighter from Op. Group Una., still sporting his German issue tunic.

The confusing story of Huska’s forces was centered around the protection of Muslim settlements under their control in northwestern Bosnia. They distinguished themselves in the fighting at Velika Kladusa during the summer of 1943, fighting on the axis side only to re-defect to the partisans in early 1944. What made them valuable to both SS and partisans was their Muslim manpower.
The Germans demanded from the Croats that all of his men be surrendered to the SS, to go towards reinforcing battered units and partisans wanted to form Muslims units of their own (for diplomatic reasons). In reality the men went their own ways, some preferred the easy Ustasa duties when faced with the option of joining the SS, and others switched sides entirely.

It was with the end of Huska’s Vojska and arrival of 13. SS to northeastern Bosnia that Tito’s recruitment of Bosnian Muslims began in full swing. Tito tries to combat the SS recruitment across central and northern Bosnia by forming Muslims units and denying Handschar the replacements it so dearly needed later on. His successes were slim until September.
The partisan propaganda urged that the they do not slaughter their “brother Serbs for Hitler”
So, Tito moved his Muslim units out of Handschar security zone. Fearing that his partisans of the Muslim faith wouldn’t do so well in the face of a Muslim SS Division.
The forces he maneuvered into northeastern Bosnia still lost their morale, especially in the face of big offensives Handschar carried out. The Germans took advantage of this.
They used the example of a partisan officer who deserted to join Handschar, who then urged that his former comrades follow in his foot steps.
Division’s loudspeaker vehicle convinced 150 Muslims from Bihac to join as well as 20 partisans to desert
The partisan desertions were considerable, but not at the scale the Mufti predicted (10,000)

An NCO belonging to 13. SS riding beside a formation of Green Cadre (Zeleni Kader) militia. The youngsters in the background enthusiastically salute. He could be a liaison looking for replacements or new recruits to be turned over to the replacement training unit.

Two brothers visiting their parents, spring 1944.

Men on furloughs were always at the mercy of the Ustasa propaganda to leave the SS for the more relaxed Ustasa or Domobran duties in the vicinity of their villages. This offer would’ve appealing to many in late august of 1944.

The Zeleni Kader faction concerned only with Muslim nationalism openly threatened to increase their own negative influences on 13. SS if their own personal vendetta against the Cetniks wasn’t carried out.
Nevertheless, their bark was worse than their bite, the Green Cadres began leaning towards the partisans in the last months of ‘44.
Yet among all the oddities to happen in this timeframe, none was more out of place than the Muslim Cetnik battalion of the Majevicas, which had its own gospel.

Cooperation with Cetniks, explained.

At the time of Maiglockchen the Cetniks, in fear of reprisals by the Muslim SS Division, pushed for increased cooperation between the Germans, especially the SS units in Bosnia. To the point where they even spread propaganda amongst the Muslim population of northeastern Bosnia, urging for an alliance against the common enemy, communism. The people must’ve been in disbelief of their rediculous proposal.
The cetniks alliance was described loose and proved that they were merely using the enemy. They would only report when they needed food or were low on ammunition.
One German reported noted:

“By no means is this Cetnik propaganda conducted in good faith. The political interest of the present and the fear of revenge from the Muslims who now posses a lethal weapon, the 13th SS Division, are responsible… There is no doubt that when the time is right, the Cetniks will attempt to seize the political and military initiative in eastern Bosnia to achieve their dream of Greater Serbia.”

After quite a few engagements, Cetniks were seen stripping dead division members of valuables, boots, uniforms and weapons from older battlefields. In quite a few cases when they were attached to the SS, they stayed in the reserve until the tide was turned, upon with point they would try to claim their “share” of the spoils of war.

Huska Milkovic’s militia was now being dissolved and its men weren’t allowed (by the Croatian officials) to reinforce Handschar or the newly forming Kama.
His men opted the easy and relaxed duty in the Ustasa militia, little if none chose to join the SS.
Promising better pay, promotions and easier duties, the Ustasa kept spreading its own version of propaganda into the ranks of the division, all the while totally ignoring the worsening situation for the entire Axis front in the east. This went as far as providing false identifications for the deserters.

 

Early September 1944

The allied air offensive “Operation Ratweek” coincided with the Axis pull out from Greece, focusing its attacks on any means of transportation that would slow down or stop German rail and road traffic. According to some sources, Handschar’s Flak battalion had spent some of its summer months interdicting the allied planes south of the division’s area of operations. Towards the end of 1944 it was detached for service (as Flak Abt 509) on the eastern front as well. This same flak battalion had accounted for nearly 60 aerial kills during Unternehmen Osterei.

Battles and Skirmishes of late 1944

Right: SS Scharfuhrer with a Mauser rifle
Battle for Srebrenik

SS Private with 98k carbine.
Handschar and the Cetniks

In coordination with allied strafings of axis units, the partisan activity kicked up as well. Tens of kilometers of railroads were sabotaged. Making things worse, the Croatian units in the division’s western flank were suffering from mass desertions and were no longer considered reliable. Thus followed a re-shifting of units to meet the partisans in the Gracanica-Malesici-Doboj area.
1st Batt. 27th SS Regt was dispatched to Simin Han, 2nd Batt. to Rastocnica. While Regt. 27’s 3rd Batt, and 28’s 2nd went to the Srnice area. A few days of heavy fighting went by and Slatna eventually fell to I/28.
13. Sept – positions relieved by Ustasa units, rest and re-fit in Brcko.
17. Sept. 1944 – Tuzla falls to the partisans. Which claim to have stormed it’s garrison and took control, when in reality many sources claim no one was defending the town.

Battle of Janja 3-5. Oct. ’44

Ambush at Vukosavci, 9. Oct. ’44

Leaving Bosnia:

The Great March 16-24. Oct. ’44

Handschar’s Second Mutiny:

Defection:

More bad news followed when Himmler ordered to disarm around 2,000 Bosnians. Surprisingly his main concern was the loss of weapons, not manpower. A good number of those 2,000 were put to use with auxiliary units in Croatia to perform maintenance and construction duties.

 

Unternehmen Hackfleisch

4. August 1944

Operations of 9-29. aug’44:

9. aug – an enemy force converging on Sekovici was destroyed, losing 73 KIA (enemy). In the follow on days, smaller level operations begin focusing on partisans in Osmaci, Puracic, Konjuh and Testnica. In all of which the partisans are sent running.

20. aug. – the 27th East Bosnia Div (partisan) was intercepted trying to take Bratunci, split into two and badly beaten (enemy losses – 52 KIA)

28-29.aug – the division is allowed to rest due to operational exhaustion

30. aug – 11th Krajinska Div. is spotted maneuvering in the Vlasenic area. Battalion III/28 corners the fleeing enemy on Debelo Brdo (I looked for this location but could only find two hills with the same name in the Tuzla area, 40-50km away). The high ground is eventually taken after a fierce 18hr battle in which Handschar’s crew served weapons proved decisive.

III/28 gains and losses for the actions of 28-31 aug.’44:

121 partisans killed, 18 friendly KIA. Equipment captured: 4 MGs, 42 rifles.

 

 

Unternehmen Heidrose

17. July 1944

Objective was to finally attack the partisan stronghold north west of Šekovići.
The Germans were convinced they had a lot of underground bases and supply depots here. This would actually prove to be one their most successful and accurate predictions yet. Since Šekovići is still today considered as one of the first places from which the first uprisings in Yugoslavia were organized, as well as many brigades were formed. It served as a logistics center for the eastern Bosnian sector where new volunteers could be armed.
“Šekovići was a military, political and cultural center for whole Eastern Bosnia. And inside of it was the highest military and political leadership for Easter Bosnia.”
Rudi Popover 1943

From the start a minimal number of forces was used, against the advice of the higher command to wait. Another promise of a jump by the SS paratroop units was made but never actualized, instead a battalion and further Prinz Eugen units were used, since they were already in position.

Elements of Regt. 27 under temporary command of SS-Obersturmbannführer Erich Braun, swung westward across the mountains.

Due to the early successes of the operation, Regt. 28 units were convinced only disorganized partisans were leftover and would pose no threat. So they went elsewhere for the time being. As shown by the first two maps, approaches from the north and east were most effective and less noticeable, if not easiest. The approach of the 7th SS units was detected by the partisans in Vlasenica and the roads they would’ve taken to Šekovići would channel them right into the enemy attacks. Either way, they did their assigned duties well and blocked the southbound roads and all possible escape routes.

It is likely that there was little communication with the Cetnik battalion since they did not commit all of their men, in some cases they just stood by.

Finally, having driven all of the enemies out, the SS units were allowed the opportunity to look for the partisan bases. The Cetniks, who had taken little part in the actual fighting around Šekovići, were now eager to loot what the partisans left over. It should be noted that one of their favorite tactics was to be on the flanks of SS units that scattered partisans, as they found a sweet opportunity in it to ambush the retreating partisans for weapons and equipment. Many executions happened during such events, and after the partisans found the bodies in the following days, the nearby SS units were accredited with the deeds.
The cooperation with the Cetniks during July 1944, resulted in the partisans complaining (in post war accounts) about everything from rapes of partisan nurses to executions of regular partisans who have surrendered.

Even tough the division’s intelligence officers insisted that those bases had to be there, nothing was found on the first day. They were allowed one more day and were astounded at what they finally found.

In one day’s searching they had found more than during the period of 7. April – 15. June having paid 24 men for it.
What they had found could’ve armed an entire partisan brigade with enough ammo to last at least half a year of heavy fighting. In Bandenbekampfung, this is preferred, because you are preventing more hostile people from being armed into active insurgents. Capturing enemy stockpiles puts a strain on it’s ability to counterattack and for the time being the enemy looses it’s momentum. It’s comparable to destroying an entire brigade without firing a shot.
Hampel was so impressed that he proposed that Braun receive the Ritterkreuz.

The situation in NE Bosnia summed up.

July 29th – Ustasa and Green Cadres units pushed out of Kladanj, III/28 takes it back.

 

Close Quarters Weapons

“The Bosnian is a very good soldier. His strength lies in the use of terrain and in close combat. With the infantry attack he is in his element”

The most widely used pistol in the division was the 9mm P38. Imams were issued the Walther PP. Reflecting their non-combat status. Imam Halim Malkoc can be seen wearing the Walther PP holstered during a speech after receiving the Iron Cross for foiling the Villefranche mutiny. There is little evidence to believe that the Luger saw significant use in the division. Nevertheless, close quarters weapons, ranging from grenades and bayonets to pistols were traditional tools of the trade for the Bosnian infantry.
Many nations pride themselves on their skill with the bayonet and romanticize the bitter hand to hand fighting that they excelled at.

Above is a picture of the “buzdovan” (unknown Bosnian WW1 museum)
Reminiscent of the medieval times, buzdovan is a wooden or iron bat with nails or sharp edge on the top.
It was used in face to face battle by the “Old Breed” against the Italians in WW1 to a deadly effect. Italian crews were known to abandon their machine guns when overrun by Bosnians charging with buzdovans.
(source: cited from various award citations: 1 famous case of Infanterist Serif Miljkovic from Bh IR. 2, from northern Bosnia, it’s likely that one of his sons or grandsons served in the Waffen SS)

Sidearms – Seitengewehre:

(Seitengewehr frogs were normal issue, they weren’t the special SS issue, atleast in the pictures I’ve studied)

Hand Grenades – Hand granaten:

Cut away diagrams of the Stgr. 24 and Eihgr. 39.

 

Same grenades in booby trap form (pretty simplistic, it only required a trip wire string tied to the porcelain ball/blue fuse cap) The Eihgr. 39 (top left) was fitted with a special Z.Z. (Zug Zunder) 35 pull fuze, made especially for trip wires. The Zug Zunder could be most associated with the Pioniere as it was one of the signature tools of their trade.
The ZZ 35 was used with everything from small anti personnel egg grenades to Teller mines meant to do bigger damage.

SS Division Kama

Men of the division in training, Batschka, Hungary. Late summer 1944.

“My goal is clear: The creation of two territorial corps, one in Bosnia, the other in Albania. These two corps, with the Division ‘Prinz Eugen’, as an army of five SS mountain divisions is the goal for 1944.” Himmler to Phleps May 22. 1944
The intent of this single statement by Himmler, arguably, started a series of blunders made by him and the SS leadership in the handling of their Balkan allies and ultimately their ability to keep the insurgent enemy suppressed. Merely six days later he recieved permission from Hitler to form the second Bosnian mountain division. The actual approval to raise the division was given on the 17th of June, under the name “Kama”
Another formation with a name reminiscent of the Ottoman period. Kama was a shorter fighting knife designed for close hand to hand fighting. It’s even mentioned in Japanese folklore.
Batschka was chosen as the training ground by Sauberzweig warning Himmler that the recruits “should not be trained in Bosnia……….due to the Ustasa’s negative influences.”

The decision to raise Kama brought about a number of changes to Handschar.
Handschar lost it’s oldest and most respected commander, Sauberzweig, 3 NCOs from every company and a few officers. Regt. 28’s commander, Raithel was chosen as the division’s first commander.
Sauberzweig on the other hand was given his own SS mountain corps (IX. Waffen-Gebirgs Korps der SS)

Aufklarungs Abt. 13 was planned to be the nucleus of this new division, however due to it’s parent division’s busy schedule starting in June, it and many other units couldn’t not be transferred until later.

Meeting with Himmler
Sauberzweig visited Himmler in Berlin only three days after handing over Handschar. Needless to say, Himmler wasn’t spared the truth about the ever worsening situation. His main complaints were about tactics. If the (Handschar) division continued to conduct offensive operations outside the security zone, sooner or later, enemy units would assemble to it’s rear and wreak havoc where it’s units felt safe. If such a move was taken, all of the previous progress would’ve been lost. Thus loosing the support of the people.
His other points were:
1. More Bosnian territory could be taken over and pacified but not liberated (from influences)
2. If the men were overworked, Ustasa’s propaganda would be more effective
3. The formation of Skanderbeg weakened Handschar’s combat strength by 25%

Coming events would prove Sauberzweig’s predictions only too accurate.
“If the elements of the division are moved out of their homeland, desertions will increase, as the men would much rather remain in their home villages as militia than hunt for the enemy.”

Taking his advice, Himmler made sure Handschar didn’t move out (for a couple of months at least), he also compensated it for Kama with 500 local Volksdeutsche as replacements.
Nevertheless, after all of these precautions he wouldn’t get good news even from his closest advisors.

During his travels to Croatia, Himmler’s recruitment officer realized the truth about the situation.
“the induction of 10,000 Croatian citizens of the Islamic faith (was) not possible, for such a number of reliable youngsters (was) simply not available, and thus Catholic Croatians will be (accepted).”
SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger 13. August 1944
Training of the Kama

It was planned to train and form the division in the same manner as Handschar. It began to take shape in July-August time frame.

1) Recruit Depot – Sambor;
2) Recruit Depot – Bosujaci
3) Between Sambor and Verbas
-55.Waffen-Gebirgsjaeger-Regiment der-SS (kroatische Nr. 3)
-56.Waffen-Gebirgsjaeger-Regiment der-SS (kroatische Nr. 4)
4) Kula – Waffen-Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment der-SS (kroatische Nr. 2)
5) Centamas – located the old Handschar Aufklarungs Abt…..now redesignated SS-Aufkl. Abt 23.
Peak strength: 3,793 men (September 1944)

There is no explanation behind the sun shaped collar patch. It was supposed to be issued following the completion of training but since no unit was fully trained, none were produced. The design itself has no connection to any Bosnian tradition to my knowledge.

The M44 dot uniform was in decent numbers in this unit. Kama had one of the few cases of national arm shields and other insignia being sewed onto camouflage tunics such as the M44 dot pattern.

Headgear discipline was loose, those who got fezzes wore them, for all others SS Bergmutzes and side caps had to do. Headwear did not denote religion, as it sometimes did in Handschar. Where you’d have non-Muslim members wearing the side cap. After all the Third Reich was coming to an end in less than a year. There were other equipment priorities.

Majority of the men still hoped to show up as a welcomed sight to the Handschar division and follow in their footsteps in Bosnia. Unfortunately for them the SS leadership had other plans.
In it’s last stages of training, the units of the division were in danger of literally becoming a part of the eastern front, because the Russians were getting so close to their training grounds.
On Sept. 24, the decision was made that the Bosnians under SS-Standartenführer Hellmuth Raithel are to be transported south to Bosnia. Initially the idea was to still form 2 Bosnian divisions. Where Kama would borrow men from Handschar. Himmler still clung on to the idea of creating an SS mountain army in the south.
He even suggested that the Mufti make a last visit to the Muslim SS troops in Hungary on the 11th of October to bolster the morale. It never happened due to the heavy fighting in the area.

After a short combat experience on the eastern front the men reported to Handschar in northern Bosnia.
It’s last commander was SS-Oberführer Gustav Lombard. A man who shared the unit’s bad luck. He was in “command” of 4 separate units in less than 4 months.
The divisional number 23 was handed off to a Dutch volunteer division on the 31. Oct 1944.

In some respects, it can be said that the idea wasn’t a complete failure. The SS war machine received over 2,000 men in the end. Some sources also state that the reliable members of the division went towards forming the nucleus of the 31st SS Grenadier division.

The memory of this second division is unknown to most Bosnians and some people who study this subject. If Handschar has had little research done on it, this unit has had virtually none. Even if it’s story is told, the information is loose and parroted.

Bosnian SS members that joined in the summer of 1944. Trained with the Kama division, and were later on transferred to Handschar. The caption below the picture seems to say that they might’ve been killed at Bleiburg 1945. Also indicating that they had fought on the eastern front.
The days following the Battle of Lopare were fairly calm until the last week of the month, when partisan activity in the area stepped up. The newly formed III/28 was deployed to the Maglaj area on the 26th of June to deal with the partisan threat to the security zone along the Spreca river. The division’s Aufklarungs and Panzerjager troops were sent to relieve the Croatian forces who were pushed out of Derventa. A cetnik battalion within the security zone was mauled by the partisans on the 29th, who pulled back before SS units could chase them down. It was one of those amazing paradoxes of WW2. The cetniks didnt prove too dependable operationally especially during partisan sweeps, and now…they enjoyed protection from the Bosnian SS division.
On the 30th, II/28 pushed back a partisan force of 7-8,000 men attempting to take Sekovici, an action which would earn it’s commander, Hans Hanke, a German Cross in Gold.

The next few days saw the partisans attempt to cross the Sava and attack the division’s security zone from the north. Their first attempt on the 1st and 2nd of July was an enormous failure, German units lay in wait on the riverbank, holding their fire till the first partisan laden boat was half way across. Another attempt was made on the 7th, this time the Germans pursued the partisans, crossing the river in assault boats with artillery support, and pushing the partisans back into the Bosut forest.
Earlier on the 4th, yet another attempt was launched by the partisans, this time in the eastern most edge of the security zone, Doboj. A partisan force believed to be 2,500 strong was attempting to cross the river Bosna, was stopped on the 10th, loosing 137 men killed and 12 captured. II/28 lost 2 men.

This series of attacks would eventually take a toll on the members of the division, coupled with other political influences and coming events, Handschar’s long streak of good luck and success would be stopped by an unlikely person.

Unternehmen Fliegenfänger

14. July 1944

The strip today. It has been divided in two parts following the war, two: kilometer by 200 yard wide parts. Most likely by nearby farmers who now cultivate the land.

Pioniere der SS-Geb. Pi. Abt. 13

A bridging unit works on a bridge as men of Regt. 27 pass by with their pack mules.
(On a side note, this picture has a couple cases of the M40 side cap being worn instead of the fez. It should be noted that most of the enlisted men were issued 2 items of headgear, the side cap during training and the fez upon completion of training. The green fez could be seen worn during parades and ceremonies contrary to the popular idea that both enlisted and officers wore the red fez during such occasions. It simply wasn’t a priority. Some of the more nationalistic members of the division were known to take off the Chessboard patch, showing their dissatisfaction with the NDH state.)

It was this unit that bore the bad fortune of having to put down the September mutiny. Some of it’s more prominent members were SS-Pioniers Jasarevic, Okanadzic, and off course their commander and Imam.

Waffen SS Reconnaissance Battalion 13

The Bosnian SS Recon battalion had the luck of being one of the best and most dependable units within Handschar, it proved itself exceptional from training to the fighting on the eastern front in Hungary towards the end of the war.

From it’s foundation at Neuhammer it’s leadership was mostly Volksdeutsche and Bosnian, so there was no language barrier as there was in some of the regular infantry companies. At Neuhammer they focused on small arms training and patrolling. Its motorized sections practiced driving.

During operations in Bosnia, it was common for them to operate separately from the infantry regiment and were very often the first into unknown territory.
In June of 44, Aufklarunds Abt. 13 became the nucleus of the newly formed 2nd Bosnian SS division nicknamed “Kama.” Fortunately for them, they didn’t have to move to Hungary and join their new unit in training there. They remained in action in Bosnia.

AUFKLARUNGS!

Summed up as the eyes and ears of their parent unit, Waffen SS Aufklarungs were always abteilung (battalion) sized. They rarely worked at company strength. They enjoyed superior mobility with their Schwimmwagens. The amphibious car would most often carry a fire team (4 men with a light machine gun – MG42) Textbook tactic was to attack the enemy’s flanks and rear, achiever surprise, probing attacks, repeated attacks to quickly destroy isolated enemy pockets. Aufklarungs units would also be tasked with pursuing fleeing enemies.

Ambushes would only be executed if a live prisoner could be captured. At the same time it was not uncommon for them to overrun enemies, if a weak point along the front was discovered by the spahtruppen, larger recon elements would be called in to try take the position through heavier firepower and hold it until reinforcements could be moved in.
They themselves were always exposed, vulnerable to attack and being overrun so pitched battles were avoided whenever possible.
Unpredictability was their favorite weapon in the offense. Artillery could be called in on adjacent units prior to an attack but a different section of the front would be actually assaulted, throwing the enemy off. For tougher jobs they were accompanied by pioniers (combat engineers)

The smallest unit was the size of a German rifle squad, 8 men and an NCO. In a sense it was the continuation of the Sturmtruppe legacy of WW1.
A huge empahsis was placed on teamwork within this community
“Teamwork is a secret of successful reconaissance. Haphazardly formed recon, made up on men who have never worked together before were of little value” they had to be resourceful under pressure, functioning as a unit under a leader with confidence.”

SS issue smocks were a favorite among Aufklarungs troops.

Their primary mission was gelandeerkundung (terrain reconnaissance) Objectives had to be clear and communication good. As a normal practice, backpacks, letters, epaulletes, written documents and other unnecessary equipment was left behind. In case of capture, personal documents could reveal a lot of information to the enemy, so no written orders concerning their operations was ever written.
To cover the objective from all possible angles the group would be split up and provided a challenge and password. Calling out in the enemy’s language (which in the case of the Bosnians or Volksdeutsche members wasn’t hard) would cause further confusion. Opening fire prematurely was discouraged, and as a general rule of ambushing in danger of being compromised, fire should be held until the last possible moment, always a second longer.
After action reports were immediately written down following their return. Information gathered often changed the outcome of the battles to come. Uncertainty and 3rd party info had to be clearly stated and not taken in as truth.

Example of an after action report:

“Cunning, versatility, ability to grasp orders rapidly, skill at driving vehicles across any type of terrain, the offensive spirit, resourcefulness under all circumstances and especially at night, cold bloodedness, and ability to act quickly and independently should be characteristics of men selected for reconnaissance units.”

– German handbook.

A patrol on horseback conferring with a Chetnik about partisan whereabouts.

Unternehmen Vollmond

Plans were based off intel derived from decrypted partisan radio messages. Sauberzweig ordered that the forces mobilize to prevent the enemy from advancing north towards the Majevica-Posavina-Semberija area.

Plan being as follows:
‘1st and 2nd Battalion from 27. SS Regiment to attack south towards Visoka Glava (I/27) and Jasenica (II/27) with support of 2nd Battery located in Donja Trnova.
1st Battalion from 28. SS Regiment to hold heights around Priboj covering position of 6th and 7th Battery and after attack starts it will link up with 4th Battalion from 28. SS Regiment which was in Lopare.’
The general idea was: “assault the enemy from the north and west, pushing him against the Drina.” (Sauberzweig)
It commenced on the early morning of June 8th at 3:45 AM.

SS-Ostuf. Heinz Driesner’s I/28 battalion was moved in position to block the “weaker” forces that in reality was the partisan western column of advance. So, a single battalion with 2 supporting batteries now stood alone in front of the advancing 16th Vojvodina division.

I/28 was made up of fresh recruits, some with zero training. One partisan commander said “The situation was ripe for action.” This was contrary to Sauberzweig’s beliefs, as he assumed the partisans would bypass Lopare and the Priboj area.

German positions:

Driesner’s men made their last stand on the hill southeast of Lopare, and behind them, less than 500 meters, just across the Lopare-Priboj road was 6th Battery of AR 13, and the 7th heavy Battery with four 150mm sFH 18 howitzers. They were located on elevated ground that overlooked the road near the village of Zajednice, just east of Lopare (at the base of hill Brezovacha)

The Attack Begins

Lopare battle from the German perspective. (First hours)

Partisan attack was commenced at 1800 by the 1st Battalion of the 16th Vojvodina. It’s 4th and 5th brigades went straight towards I/28. The 2nd Vj. Brigade was an hour late but it soon joined reinforcing the assault and attacking northwest across Radojevici towards Medenik.
I/28’s mortars were firing danger close to their own men, trying to disorganize the partisan attack, which was now on top of them. Having been overrun, a number of men of the battalion were scattered, some retreated to the positions of the batteries on the hills.
(Two days later, about 500 members of the battered I/28 turned up, the partisans had made a mistake in not pursuing after I/28, and they would soon pay dearly for it at Lopare)

Heinz Rudolph, the commander of the heavy battery, had about 80 men at his disposal. The heaviest of the small arms they possessed to fend off enemy infantry was a single MG42.

Rudolph directing fire for one of his sFH 18 Howitzers.

The howitzers, meant for suppressing the enemy from a distance (in-direct fire) now found themselves shooting directly into the advancing partisans. Shooting about 4-5 shells a minute, which was still painfully slow. The 7th battery was under small arms fire before the 6th (at the village of Brezovaca) because a partisan column bypassed I/28 to east, cut the road to Priboj and was now preparing to attack (2300)
Following a heavy 4 hour firefight with the insurgents and staying true to his artilleryman spirit, Rudolph was the last to leave his howitzers that night. The survivors were out of small arms ammunition, and were now making their way towards the 6th Battery at Brezovaca.
A number of Rudolph’s men were buried on the ground they held.

Just now, was the regimental commander learning of the situation, so he mobilized II/28 to help out.
II/28 was about 30 km away in Srebrenik, they would not get there that night.

It was also soon found out that on the other flank of the battlefield, areas assigned to Regt. 27’s units were far too wide to cover and the enemy forces of the eastern column continued right through them (Regt. 27 was not mobilized soon enough to block the eastern column, it was not in position). Interestingly enough, the local Cetniks, who found themselves in the mess became the only oppostion to most of the partisan column, however they stood no chance and were quickly scattered.

“Re-take Lopare or be court-martialed!”

SS Regiment 28’s commander, Helmuth Raithel, watching his forces counterattack Lopare on the 9th (the illustration is that of a regimental staff officer)

II/28 having taken off at 0200 on the 9th wouldn’t move into position to attack till 1600 that day. Konig, CO of 9./28 found Heinz Driesner and received orders from Raithel to re-take Lopare or face court-martial.
Driesner was killed in action the next day faithful to his orders. Town was in German hands once again at 1730 that evening, and the partisans evacuated the area with heavy casualties.
The entire western column had retreated so fast that II/28 was not able to catch up to it

In the east, Regt. 27 enjoyed some success in blocking the eastern column’s advance. The story was, 6 howitzers, four 105mm cannons and 3 AA guns convinced the partisans to pull back.
On the 12th, partisans were pushed back across the Spreca river.

Aftermath:

(Bergmann MPs were among the small arms used at Lopare)

Heinz Stratmann, described the scene at the position where the men of the 7th Battery fought and died:

“It was a scene of destruction. The partisans had been unable to take the big guns, prime movers, or vehicles with them and had destroyed them. Thirty eight soldiers of the battery had been killed and eight were missing. I wont go into detail about how gruesomely our dead were mutilated by the enemy, but I will say that even during my two years of combat in Russia I had never experienced anything so horrible. As it was not possible to move all of the bodies to the military cemetery at Celic, the dead were buried where they had fallen.”

Eduard Roth also added how “…provisions were plundered. The tent was completely ransacked, all of the rucksacks were emptied and the personal effects were strewn about…”

During the previous Balkan war the area was mined and yet again fought for.

Sauberzweig claimed 3,000 dead partisans following the operation, which was thought to be slightly exaggerated.
The official German report stated the following.
1586 enemy killed. Having lost 205 SS men, 528 wounded and 89 missing in action. The partisan report claims that of the 89 that went missing, 30 were captured.
The SS did not record having taken prisoners or loosing men to the partisans as POWs.

The partisan report isn’t credible at all considering the magnitude of the battle and the counterattacks. The entire 16th Vojvodina admitted to 230 dead and wounded. While other reports inflated the Germans’ casualties to 350 on June 9th alone.
In fact, partisans of this division’s particular brigades suffered more non combat related casualties in less than a month and a half of marching than they were admitting they sustained during combat operations
67 partisans died from hunger and exhaustion during marches (July 23- Sept. 3 1944), 130 were once classified wounded because of poor footwear (1943). Thus it’s hard to believe their low casualty rates when they were facing 150mm howitzers at point blank range.

Counterattack of II./28 battalion prevented 16th Division to capitalize on its success and it only managed to take 60 rifles, six MG-42s and two Bergmann M-34 SMGs, 1 mortar (from I/28) , 13 pistols, 20.000 7.92 mm rounds, 100 pairs of boots, 180 uniforms, 60-70 horses… forcing it to quickly destroy 6 out of 8 captured howitzers, trucks, several cars, two motorcycles also leaving large number of shells intact (Pack mules were not spared by the partisans during the attack, it’s suprising that those 60 or so horses stayed alive)

The Cetniks, who were not present during the battle, would be seen in the following weeks scavenging for weapons and left over equipment where the SS men had fallen.
After talks with the Cetnik leaders, Hampel was able to convince them to have the equipment returned.
12 machine guns (I think both SMGs and LMGs) and 40 carbines (Karabiner 98s) and some radios.

The estimated strength of the 16th Vojvodina was slightly over 4,000 before Vollmond, the battle at Lopare had severely mauled it and the partisans were trying to cover up their own losses. Their brief occupation of Lopare and the destruction of 6 howitzers hoping to destroy the inexperienced I/28, had cost them 1586 men.