Palestine 1948

Much like the rumors surrounding the die hards of the W-SS in the post war years at places like Dien Bien Phu, there are plenty of the same concerning Bosnians and their supposed deeds in the middle eastern wars of the late 1940s. The leading story is that al-Husseini was trying to save as many of them from European POW camps and in doing so found hundreds and even thousands (by some sources) of willing fighters in time for the 1948 war. In reality, all except for a chance meeting with Dzozo in 1968 in Cairo, al-Husseini never came back in contact with the men he helped recruit in 1943.
It was opportunity for many of them. Those fearing punishment for war crimes saw exile as a favorable alternative. Tito actually supported them in this, and exiled hundreds of former Ustasa to the Levant. It is unclear which position he personally held on the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, but it was a win-win scenario, so long as he was rid of potential trouble makers. The majority however simply went back to Bosnia in 1945-46 to face whatever punishment they had coming. For some it was hard labor, a year or two in a prison and a year of service in the Yugoslavian army before being pardoned.
The Zionist article out of which these details were taken out of makes the claim that the 1947 Bosnians were following in the footsteps of those that left Bosnia in 1878 during the decline of the Ottoman empire and settled in the Levant. It also goes on to tie in the 1990s War of Independence to the religious troubles in the middle east and the supposed roots of that war in WW2. It is all far fetched and plagued with the admitted lack of details and uncertain numbers.
So it was that in 1947, the Syrian govt made a request for the 8.000 Bosnian Muslims refugees at that time in Italy. By December of the same year, the Palestinian Post reports “Bosnian S.S. in Syrian Forces” (December 19th 1947) The article boasts that the nucleus of the division has reformed at Damascus. Israel Baer also went on to say that “the latest recruits to the Syrian army are members of the Bosnian Waffen SS” and that they were “directing a school for commando tactics for the Syrian army.” If not odd enough, Yugoslavia supported the Palestinian cause until Sept 3rd 1948. Tito himself ordered the extradition of some of those former Ustasas, leaving the option of fighting for the Arabs open to them.
A series of Palestine Post headlines best illustrates how this myth got underway.
April 18th 1947 – “Syria wants Muslim Nazis”
December 19th 1947 – “Bosnian S.S. in Syrian Forces”
February 2nd 1948 – “Ustashis join Arabs” (21 Croats that came over on the 14th of March, along with “20 Yugoslavs and 67 Albanians”)
March 2nd 1948 “Arabs need Balkan soldiers”
April 1948 – 200 Bosnians arrive to Beirut aboard the SS Augustina
April 9th 1948 “Nazi Fighting Forces to support Arabs”
(Palestine Post daily was established in Jerusalem in 1932 as part of a Zionist-Jewish initiative) It goes to prove that members of Handschar could still be exploited for propaganda purposes. It seems that to the survivors of the Holocaust in Europe now fighting for independence, nothing made for better propaganda than to say that they were still fighting the same enemy. Which was entirely true. The numbers they reported weren’t however.

Total figures:
520 Bosniaks (57 in Syria)
67 Albanians
111 Croats (Syria mostly – May 1948)
890-1,000 Yugoslavs (?) and Albanians in the Middle East – May 1948

2-3 April 1948 -Reports indicate a 100 or so Bosnians may have taken part in the battle for Kastel
25 April – 5 May, Reports tell of “400 Yugoslavs defend Jaffa”. Actual records seem to indicate that the place was defended by locals instead
The details on the participation of the Bosnian or all Yugoslav volunteers (to include Croats and Albanians) during these two battles is so vague that no one can place them. Individual testimony is all that exists. Croatian news agency Večernji List also covered this pro Arab crusade (Dec. 23 2005) Their story has the same origins in the Italian POW camp in the year 1947. It mentions a “150 Ustasas from Handschar” and partisan division being sent over to support the Arabs all on Tito’s direct order.
Their article centers around Kamel Rustomović. Who apparently stuck around with the division until it’s surrender to the British. He is currently still alive and living in Beirut. During the Battle at Jenin, he makes the claim that the (150) Bosnians and members of the “Tito division” under the command of Fuad Šefkobegović destroyed 10 Israeli tanks. The latter fought fanatically and to the last, according to Kamel. On the 29. Nov 1948, at Haram they were “betrayed” by the Arabs who were routing by then.
Other accounts were pieced together by one, Emilio Traubner, who came across the diary of Jusuf Begovic (from Pale, Sarajevo) His sources show 70,000 Bosnian Muslims (soldiers with civilians/families) in the Taranto area Italy 1947 (highly unlikely).

Other Legacies

If not ironic enough, certain figures that are central to the story of the Handschar division kept and keep re-surfacing to this day in highly unlikely places. Somewhere behind the scenes of this meeting with the Pres. of Egypt is Tito’s translator and former Sturmbannfuhrer Husein Dzozo. Dzozo accompanied Tito in his travels throughout the Arab countries in the decades after the war when the Communist bloc was jockying for power and influence in the region. Dzozo recently re-surfaced once again when a school in Gorazde was named after him. The Serb population of the country was quick to villify him and draw links to his war-time service with the Germans but to be fair he worked extensively as a reformist in the latter half of his life.

Tito’s troops never truly defeated the Handschar division, they came close at Lopare but were thrown back by German reinforcements. Instead the most destructive strategem he ever played was the offer of amnesty to all those that came over to his side at the close of the year 1944. Coupled with events on the eastern front and elsewhere this move cost the Handschar division thousands. It also aided in the healing of old wounds after the war.

Above: Muslim partisans that defected in 1944 from the Handschar division and other German formations.

The Final Months

6. March – Unternehmen Fruhlingserwachen begins (lasts 10 days)
13. SS remains in the Margarettestellung for the duration of Op. Fruhlingserwachen. Expecting the German positions at Haromfa to be weaker now, the Soviets attack several times and are thrown back each time. The lull in the fighting allows pioniers to assist units of the 71st Wehrmacht in clearing 5,000 Russian mines. It is likely that this decision was undertaken with the future thoughts of offensive actions in Hungary.

7. March – “heavy fighting lasting the whole day, northeast of Jako.”
8. March – “a mere company stops an enemy in battalion strength south of Haromfa, enemy halted, three tanks disabled”
9. March – “3 POWs taken near Haromfa (estimated 80 enemy dead). Friendly casualties: 19 dead, 62 wounded (!), 5 missing.”
11. March – “enemy counterattack beaten back.”
16-17. March – Kampfgruppe Hanke attacks Heresznye (its last offensive action of the war) Advances 300m before being called to a halt, Russians thrown out of their positions.

29. March – The 1st Bulgarian and 57th Soviet Armies launch an all out offensive against the 2nd Panzer Army.
“Enemy infantry once again exploited gaps and closed in the distance fast resting in sunken ground close in front of 13 SS positions where only mortars could hit them and the latter ran out of proper propellant charges for such short ranges.”
30. March – I/27 repulses Russians at Csurgo.

2. April – Soviets strike between the 118th Jager and 71st Inf. Divisions, once against almost encircling the 13th SS Division at Bajca. The retreat to the Mura river begins.
3-5. April – Flak units leave Nagykanizsa and cross at Letnye
Companies from II/27 provide a rearguard, holding the Soviet armor off long enough for the crossing to happen. In the attrition entire companies are dwindled down to platoon strength.
Likewise at Kotoriba and armed only with rifles, elements of the division knock out some of their first tanks in urban combat. Here the division consolidates and forms line Dravovid where it holds out against lead Soviet units for 3 days.
6. April – the battlegroup retreats within the borders of Grossdeutschland. Here they were augmented here by everyone from Hungarian infantry, Volkssturm to Italians.
7. April – I/27 is initially thrown out of its positions but regains them during a counterattack.

“On 9 April, six of us were ordered to conduct reconnaissance of Russian positions. As were carrying this out, the Russians detected us and opened fire. I was shot in my left knee. We returned to our lines. What rotten luck! The war would be over in less than a month and I am wounded!”                                                               -Ibrahim Alimabegovic

Ibrahim’s CO (I/27) offered a similar after-action report for 8. April 1944:

“After a short but intense artillery barrage the enemy came at us. We were quickly thrown out out of our positions. The order from the regimental commander stated specifically that the line was to be held at all costs….so we counter-attacked and regained the lost ground. While firing at the retreating enemy, I was shot through my right arm. As my wound was being attended to we came under enemy mortar fire that injured a number of the men, including our imam.”

Another veteran summed it up this way:                                                                                     “We fought the Russians across most of Hungary and into Austria. The most horrifying experience was being under fire by the Katyushas”

11. April – 8th Co./27th Regt. Repulses a large force of Bulgarians, killing 64, losing 10 KIA.
13. April – Russian forces fail to take Kaag.
14. April: Hill 327 (Regt 28) Slovenian Volkssturm switch sides. High ground remains German after repelling a tank assault. Two days later, Russians are pushed out of the area for the time being.
16 April: 5th Company/Regt 27 takes Hill 295 with the aid of two Hetzers. Division’s artillery thwarts a large Russian attack the next day.
19. April – Regt. 28 fights its last engagement at Kiesmanndorff
19. April – May 5th – Present positions on the Reichschutzstellung held until Capitulation. Relieved by Wehrmacht units.
29. April – Himmler commits suicide
30. April – Hitler commits suicide
5-7. May – A hasty defense taken up on the Ursulastellung.

8 May: Through Patzing – Unterochsenau – Skofzen to Hirschendorf.
9 May: Through Ragosnitz – Strahleck – Pössnitzhofen to Kunigund.
10 May: Through Georgenhof – Leutschach – Arnfels – Gründorf to Deutschlandsberg.
11 May: Through the Kor Alps to Twimberg.

8. May – news of capitulation reaches members of the division. Many Bosnians opt to head back southward and face the consequences. 3,000 remain on with the battle group, eventually ending up in a POW camp in N. Italy. Reprisals are rumored to have started as early as 24. April. It is not know how many of these ended up at Bleiburg.

Order of the day: “Do not provoke, but if they attack, destroy them.”

On the night of 7-8. May 1945 the Russians, who were 300m ahead of us began firing off signal rockets. This lasted all night. We didn’t exactly know what to make of this. The regimental command notified us of the capitulation and that we should pull out without alerting them, and that we were to cross a certain demarcation line by a certain hour. I had previously told my wife: I am not going into captivity. If I have no other option I will kill myself. – Franz Zauner
“Near Deutschlandsberg, the troops were accosted by the anti-fascist Oesterreichische Freiheitskämpfer, who demanded that the SS men surrender their weapons. The Handschar troops refused.
Near St. Oswald, the Handschar men saw their first British soldiers. As the Bulgarians were still in pursuit, the Handschar Division attempted to delay them with mines. The Russians had already seized Judenburg, so the SS Division continued its retreat through the Sau Alps. On 12 May, they passed through Lölling and Silberberg and finally reached St. Veit an der Glan.

St Veit an der Glan 12 May the Handschar Division commander, Desiderius Hampel, escorted by his adjutant, Sturmbannführer Karl Wambsganß, conducted formal surrender negotiations with the British army.” – from my correspondance with G. Lepre
“We spent the entire night with the commander of our platoon, Hstf Kinz. We could not sleep that night or over the night few nights. We could not comprehend that the end has come. The next day we arrived in Graz. A low flying Russian plane flew over us but did not fire on us. Then we began over the Alps via narrow mountain paths. The Russians were already in possession of the main roads. We crossed over the Kor and Sau Alps (now Golica and Svinja – Slovenia). There we discarded most of our baggage and most of the vehicles. The motor vehicles that could not make it were pushed off the cliffs. The Russians were right behind us. In the vicinity of Judenberg we came upon the first English tanks. They let us pass and left us with our weapons. Near St. Veit, which is near Klagenfurt, we made camp on a nearby field. From there we had to go to Munich and there be released. We took off our SS badge and rank insignia.”
W. Ebeling Aufkl. Abt .13 May 45

One division member recalled how, on the way back home, he had to first become a partisan simply to make it through their lines. He shed his SS uniform and put on a dead Domobran’s uniform. When he was finally apprehended by the partisans, they immediately inducted him into his ranks. A month went by and one day an officer began interrogating him about his age. When he found out that he was under 18, the partisan officer promptly told him to go home. Little did he know that he was letting an SS veteran go home. He joined (or was conscripted into) the SS at an age of 16 and had fought for the whole of year 1944 before turning 18.
The deserters would often discard the soldbuchs, medals and decorations in fear of retribution, if not betrayal. They would later find difficulty attaining German pensions as a result of this. The authors grandfather was one such individual who was given a German pension despite no Soldbuch.
Accord to. Imamovic, a sizeable group of Bosniaken immigrated and settled in the area around Bradford in England. Which is amusingly enough where the former chetniks were relocated to as well. Stories tell of their mutual hatred well after the war.

Post war – anti Communist Resistance.

Resistance to communist rule took part all over eastern Europe but was mostly small scale and covert. In Croatia and Bosnia it was the “Crusaders” and included both Catholic and Muslim members. They were mostly led by Ustasa officers who had no other option but to resist. Though they remained active until 1950, most were either killed or captured by 1947. Like the Wehrwolf resistence in Germany the damage they caused was negligible.

 

Movement to the Danube

“In Aufklarungs Abt. 13 was still half of those Bosnians with whom I trained with at Neuhammer. The Germans who were commissioned to lead them were relatively new (to the W-SS) and were generally poor soldiers. The veterans (Bosnians) were somewhat distrustful of their inexperience. It was almost as if they were fearful of us…. We arrived at noon, and immediately found ourself under heavy fire. The two nearest to me were killed. We had difficulty finding our way in the darkness. There was mud, streams, woods and a railroad. Our hands nearly “fell off” while digging the trenches, but it was out of them that we were able to stop the Russians. They were crossing the river at night and even in the daylight even despite our artillery and air attacks. Prior to the crossings, they would obscure the river with smoke. They stormed over to our side and dug themselves in like moles while their guns shot at us from the other bank. We were relived by “another” unit and they took us “somewhere.” It was then that I was wounded.”

– Murat B – describing the events of 11.-13. November 1944

 

The Destruction of the 51st Partisan Division on the Danube

The 51st was formed from Serbian youths who were still in their teens but now recently armed by the newly arrived Russians. Devoid of any real training or experience they were engaged into the fighting on the northern Danube bridgehead at Batina. Opposing them initially were units of the Hoch und Deutschmaster div. and Kpfgpe. Hanke which was also in the area but by all accounts it was the arrival of Aufkl. Abt. 13 that was decisive in checking the Soviet-partisan advance at Batina.

“The enemy reinforcements came in the form of the reconaissance detachment of the 13th SS division Handschar, in which were armored fighting vehicles….their attack was merciless.”
“they first suppressed our mortars with an effective use of artillery, which was then followed up by its infantry, which made use of creeping fire to encircle us and then destroy us at close range”
“they swept through the alleyways, openings in the walls, front yards, gardens: jumping from house to house and street to street.” (Bozic)

 

12. Nov. – a partisan communique reports the 4th Batt/51st as destroyed. At 1600 that same day the entire 51st is thrown back another 500m back to their previous positions. One partisan proclaimed: “to go forward was impossible, to retreat unthinkable because only the Danube and HQ was back there.” Observers from the German side noted:
“Panic spreads among the partisans, the ones that aren’t outright killed by the MG42 in the boats, are getting out and cut down in the flight. The hapless partisans, unable to dig in throw their arms up in to the air hoping to be spared.”
Amusingly, the Serb historian Savic marks Nov 12th as the day that the 12th brigade has taken back Apatina, nothing could be further from the truth. Elements of the 92nd mot. Bde, and I/27 are plugged into the fighting on the bridgehead. They are receiving close air support from the Stukas above since noon the previous day.

Enes Hadzic, an engineer with Pionier Abt. 13 illustrated his experiences of this period in a series of sketches depicting the fighting in Croatia and Hungary. “Corporal Nikola Ban (from Varazdin) fell during our attack on the Russians. That was 23.Nov. 1944 at eight in the morning. He was ordered that half of his squad be transferred over to the Kama division…Hundreds of rubber boats have been destroyed, we are sending our wounded to Bijeli Manastir.”

A machinegunner by the name of “Nazif Hankic” in a position at Bijeli Manastir.

A partisan recollected:

“They quickly destroyed two of our AT guns and a “protukolac” (small field piece?) which were exposed about a hundred meters ahead. They surrounded them from both sides via the courtyards. The commander of the 1st platoon, Bata Lacarac then lead his platoon in a counter-attack attempting to retrieve the guns. He instead ran into an impenetrable wall of German infantry and tanks which had by then occupied the ground where our “protukolac” was. Its crew perished under the tank tracks (ie. run over).”
“Around noon we found ourselves in Batina. Stukas were flying over us. There was not a single standing house in Batina. Everything was leveled and destroyed. You did not hear a single bird singing. Civilians were nowhere to be found either, only soldiers on all sides. I could not tell our soldiers from the Russians because they had exchanged caps and other uniform items. I can no longer remember which brigade or what army it was, but I still remember (the events?). I heard the voices of the Russian soldiers say: “This is like Stalingrad”
Jesic notes a special sort of camaradery between the Soviets and the partisans, but also their mutual confusion at the absence of the Soviet air force and German control of the skies above. Nevertheless, the follow on days do not see any Russian progress. On the German side, 17th Nov marks the long awaited arrival of the 31st SS Div. Batschka (or elements thereof), which are finally thrown into the fighting.

Above: A reconnaissance company is repelling the Russians and throwing them back into the Danube. “In these bloody days, we destroyed an entire division.”

Unit Diary VII/51 part. div
17. Nov. the brigade moves 500m forward. 4 dead 22 wounded.
18. Nov. situation unchanged 5 dead 25 wounded.
19. Nov. situation unchanged, enemy artillery kills 9, wounds 47, 4 are missing.
20. Nov. situation unchanged, our units did not make headway.

Total butcher’s list for the 51st partisan division Nov. 1944
1348 “out of ranks” (ie unfit for duty)
271 KIA
850 WIA

 

Recollections of a Bosnian machinegunner:

“It was an exhausting battle. The memories are painful to recollect. Man against man in the trenches, basements, over puddles, yards, vineyards. I was only saved by my better judgment. Then there was the river bank from which the Russians were constantly peering over, the other bank was a bit lower, but it was wooded. There the enemy could not be detected, neither infantry nor artillery was visible there, nevertheless they were there and they shot at us with anything and everything. So much so that you could not shut one eye to get some rest, night or day. The enemy was massing troops there as well. (Our) artillerymen said it was due to the depression (reverse slop) that they could not hit anything on the other side. On the other hand, when the Russian artillery opened up, you had to dive into the dirt nose first in order to save yourself. Wet and hungry you would crawl around in the trenches and under the cars and tanks, under which the tankers slept. I myself heard the Katyushas and the sound was horrid. At dawn you could hear the clatter of tank tracks crossing over the rubble and gravel. A German tank positioned himself near some houses. A Russian tank appeared on the high ground, and did not observe the German. The German (tank) shot and destroyed him on that first shot. Then came the second Russian tank. He too was destroyed. His turret flew off, out of which shot out flames like those in a lamp. Then the German repositioned himself and hid himself behind another house. Even the third Russian tank failed to observe him. When he (Russian) turned his corner, the German traversed his turret through and into the house, aimed the barrel and took out the third Russian. But then they also shot him and bent his “cannon” (barrel). He could not move and thus the crew bailed out.”
-Zarif Bajtar – machine gunner 28t SS Regiment – Nov. ‘44

Only when 6 Soviet divisions were enmassed on the other side of the Danube and after divisions like Hoch und Deutschmeister and Brandenburg were reduced to only two battalions of combat ready troops were the Germans finally forced to quite the bridgeheads at Apatin and Batina.

An Overview of the year 1944

“There was fewer and fewer Bosniaks, not due to desertions but because we were incurring higher losses than the Germans who were then filling our ranks. But that was entirely understandable, we were the mainstay of the division. The commanders who knew us, expected the most from us and did not know how much they could depend on the replacements (he uses the word: “new guys”). It was later said that they were preserving “German blood” while they were sending us into the fire. I did not find this to be true.”                                                                                                                  – Murat B

28. November – Soviets take Pecs, division takes up secondary positions.
30. November – Battle of St Marton. Kmpf. Hanke evades encirclement.
2. December – Div takes up positions on the Margarettestellung.

7-13 December – Battle of Haromfa, all Russian attacks repelled by Regt 27
Late December – trench warfare ensues
1. January – II Batt Regt 27 repels Russian assault
11. January II Batt. Regt 27 repels Bulgarian assault
Flak Abt 13, still in N. Croatia is put into action against Allied bombings, downing several.
Mid January – Mid February – “hardly any fighting at all”

Mid to late February – heavy fighting in the sector between Csurgo and Nagyatad
6. March – Operation Spring Awakening

 

Summer 1944

Back in the Bosut Woods, north of Bosnia

With the Division fully in Bosnia and operations underway, the partisans took the opportunity and moved back into the Bosut woods from which they were forced out of during Operation Sign Post. The nature of partisan fighting was revealing itself. Ground taken had to be held. Two operations would be launched and conducted largely by other German and Croat units to push them back out. German artillery (likely SS-Art. Regt 13 itself) shelled the villages of Bosut, Visnjicevo and Sremska Raca on the 16th and 17th of April, while 200 Feldgendarmes moved in from Kuzmin to Bosut and pushed a battalion belonging to the 2nd Srem Div. out of the Bosut forest. A partisan diary of the 6th Vojv. Bde. tells of further shelling on the 18th when the brigade staff HQ received accurate fire around dinner time. Three partisans were morally wounded after the German artillery observers spotted lanterns and partisans gathering around the field kitchen.

Unternehmen Kornblume – a third sweep of the Bosut woods 

On 14. June, German and Croat units once again set out to clean Bosut. A Croat HomeGuard brigade, Sicherungs Regiment 606, Frewilligen Polizei Regiments 1,2 and 3, as well as the VI Ustasa battalion set out flush out the communists. Operation “Cornflower” would continue into August, ending on the 6th.

Summer 1944 in Bosnia

23. June – Communists raid Prnjavor and Vis without success.

26. June – elements of Regt. 28 reinforce Croat troops in Derventa (western flank)

28. June – Allied P38s strafe one of the Division’s columns – 6 friendly dead

30. June – 8,000 partisans attack II/28 at Sekovici

1-2. July – a partisan attempt to cross the Sava river is turned back

4. July – 2,500 partisans repelled at Doboj by II/28, heavy enemy casualties.

14. July – Unt. Fliegenfanger – partisan airstrip at Osmaci captured by I/27 and II/27

17. July – Regt 27 launches Unt. Heidrose, kills 947 partisans, captures large weapons stockpile.

29. July – III/28 takes Kladanj back

4. August – the Division is mobilized for Op. Hackfleisch, scatters partisans in Vlasenica

16-26. August – operations on the southern edge of the security area, mopping up.

28-29. August – the division rests to recover from operational exhaustion

30. August – combat resumes, recon troops assault partisans at Osmaci and Matkovac

1. September – the division’s units return north to the security zone

4. September – Tito launches an offensive to the south of the Majevicas

4. September – Battle of Srebrenik – 11th Division in unable to take Srebrenik

Partisans keep up offensive actions and often return to the places from which the 13th SS had previously thrown them out. This frustrates the German efforts despite the ability to consistently defeat the partisans. This leads Sauberzweig to admit that liberating territory is an impossibility. Temporary pacification is only possible via constant German presence.

Autumn 1944

1-7. September – Operation Rat Week (allied air operation over Yugoslavia, targetting railways and major road junctions to coincide with the German withdrawal from Greece).

1-20. September – 2,000 Bosnians desert.

3. October – Battle of Janja – 28th Slavonia Div. is repelled. From this point on the division fights battles only from the defensive.

16-23. October – the division is transferred to N. Croatia.

20. October – Soviets take Belgrade

13. November – 33rd Division (partisan) attacks 7th Co/27.Regt at Sumecani.

9-10. November – lead elements take positions on the Danube bridgeheads.

An artilleryman recently recollected on those tumultive weeks of October 1944:

“We fought on the Majevica for 6-7 months and then when Belgrade fell to the Red Army we were taken to Janja. There I saw that half of the Germans were barefooted and even without rifles on the account of the loss of Belgrade to the Red Army.
We were seperated, Muslims here, Germans there, and asked “who wants to stay in Bosnia?” and fight on otherwise go stand over there and we’ll move out and fight on the Russian front.”
Ramo S. – 13. Art. Regt.

 

April-June 1944

20.IV.1944 – a certain SS-Jager Kaitjia (unusual name, perhaps misspelling) was the subject of a commendation by General Rendulic (2nd Panzer Army) for having shot down an enemy plane with his machinegun.

Zvonimir Bernwald, acting as a translator was called up in a similar case (around the same time) though he does not share additional details.

“With an MG42 we had managed to shoot down a hostile “Lightning” fighter (twin engined P38) and things were quiet for an hour. The pilots of these aircraft often had fun flying low and exploring the terrain below. Sometimes it was possible to read the writing on their fuselages. Therefore it was sometimes possible to shoot down with an MG. In May 1944, an American fighter plane was shot down in such a fashion. I was brought forward as an interpreter. I was amazed at the equipment that the airman carried. Above all else I was amazed at the maps that were found on him. The pilot was turned over to the gendarmes of the Luftwaffe.”
-Zvonimir Bernwald

B24s of the US 15th Air Force over Bosnia April 1944 (flying from Foggia, Italy to Axis positions behind the eastern front in Hungary).

*5 other American airmen were turned over to the Gendarmes that spring, though most seem to have been rescued by the partisans. Flak Abt. 13 had by this point shot down 59 allied planes (though perhaps in a different sector) but surprisingly very few airmen were recovered. Axis airpower consisted mainly of Stuka ground support, but no large scale bombings by Heinkels to speak off (footage of Heinkels in support of anti-partisan operations exists for 1943 however). Likewise German fighters seem to have been reserved for front line service too. Allied and Soviet planes consisted of B24s, P38s and IL-2s according to some sources.

Flak Abteilung 13 – Handschar’s air defense

The battalion first saw action in the area of operations normally assigned to the 7th SS Division (Capljina, Mostar area). Its batteries also manned positions in Tuzla and Bijeljina (before March 1944). With the expansion of the IX SS-Mountain Corps the detachment was re-designated as SS-Corps-Flak Det. 509. Only its 2cm batteries remained with the Handschar division, which were used to augment the Panzer Jager Abt. Around this time frame Det. 509 saw service on the eastern front. In about November the detachment was supporting SS-Police Kampfgruppe Dorner on the bridge-heads at Vukovar and Opatovici (also Vinkovci behind the line). Its larger caliber guns (88s) were used more and more in a ground anti-tank role, though 10 planes were brought down in this time frame. Following this, the detachment rejoined the Handschar division on the line south of Lake Balaton in Hungary. Its 88s once again assisted in the ground role at places like Nagykanisza and Kaposvar. In mid March 1945, the detachment 509/Flak Abt 13 kept the rail line at Nagykansiza open. On the retreat to the Reich, the 3,7cm battery moved into positions east of Marburg, while the 8,8cm battery had to struggle on its way back to the Drava line before settling in the Pettau-Friedau region, where it experienced no air activity for the remainder of the war.

Unternehmen Maibaum 23.-27.IV. 1944 (WW2’s largest anti-partisan sweep)

(“3.K” stands for the 3rd partisan corps) Op. Maibaum succeeded in preventing the 16th and 17th divisions from crossing into Serbia.

1. May – 16th Vojv. Div. totally defeated east of the Drinjaca (near Srebrenica) by units of the 7th SS. Stukas continue to pound them in their retreat
1.-5. May – Kladanj, the Feldgendarmes hold out against elements of the 16th which routs the local police/militia.
6. May – German airstrikes against the 17th (partisan) div. at Zunovi.

The partisan high command recommends fighting in the woods rather than holding out in the villages which are easily cut off from retreat.
German broadcasts announce victories in the Sudost by “German” Divisions. The names of the fighters are listed as Estonians, Latvians, Flemish and even Cossacks, much to the disapproval of the Croats/Bosnians.
14. May – Partisan communiques are compromised and their codes cracked.
15.-16. May – elements of the 16th Vojv. destroy lengths of railroads of the Tuzla-Doboj line, otherwise in retreat.

SS units begin patrolling the security zone in higher frequency. Partisans attempts at infiltration are frustrated further. The partisans are noticing that the tactics of the jagdkommando units sent out against them are similar to their own and therefore very effective.

17. May – 4th batt./16. Vojv. is repelled, both the 36th and the 16th give up hopes of taking back the Majevica mountain range.
20. May – HQ at the 38th Div vows to “expell the SS” out of the Majevicas.
Late May 1944 – Semberija and Majevica cetniks now begin collaboration with the Germans. Allied planes continue air drops to the partisans, this time S of the Majevica mountains. The II/16 receives one Bren gun with 1,500rds. It is likely that same LMG would be put to use in the upcoming partisan offensive. One would assume it was given to an experienced gunner.
6. June – 16th Vojv. holds an inspection to assess readiness

“If you flattened out the mountains of Bosnia you would get a surface the size of Russia.” – an unknown Yugoslav partisan

Battle of Lopare (from the partisan perspective)

At Lopare – the 1/16 takes the first row of trenches from I/28 while enduring howitzer fire at 500-800m. The closer they get to Zajednice the flatter the 105s have to depress to keep up with them. Red and green tracers are continually darting across the night sky as the German MGs desperately try to keep partisans at bay and away from the guns. There are now Bosnians fighting on both sides of this contest. The XO of the very battalion that took the first row of SS trenches was a Bosnian Muslim who now found himself exchanging shots with the gun crews of 13 AR.
A partisan commissar later recollected:
“I spotted a Kraut under a truck pointing his rifle at me. I yelled at him to come out or I’ll shoot him. He got up, raising his hands in tears, and started begging in Serbian language not to shoot him. He claimed he was Bosnian, that he was conscripted into the army and that he would like to stay with us and fight against the occupiers. After consulting with comrades, we decided to accept this German soldier, a Muslim from the 13th SS Division, into our ranks. We assigned several members of the Party and SKOJ to keep an eye on him. In the battles that followed, he even carried a German machine gun and proved to be a good fighter. However, we were wrong, he took the first opportunity to desert and flee back to the Germans.”
“During our first withdrawal to the starting positions, in all that mess and hand-to-hand combat, I had a mishap. I don’t know how nor when, in all the confusion I lost my commissar bag with confidential political material and lists of fighters […]. Feeling a great responsibility and guilt, I went back to search for it. The comrades tried in vain to hold me back and talk me out of such a crazy idea. Soon I realised that they were right. Only a few hundred metres from our positions, I ran into an enemy rifle squad that took cover. ‘Get him, Mujo!’… ‘Catch him, Alaga!’ – I heard them shout and simultaneously saw several ‘fez-wearers’ jumping out in front of me, trying to catch me alive. I barely managed to escape them, by jumping into a gully, and to return to my comrades again.”

9. June – partisans declare a total victory at Lopare.
10. June – The 2 partisan brigades find themselves under heavy artillery fire as they watch a determined SS counterattack. In the lead is Hans Konig’s 9th Co. (Regt. 28).
11. June SS troops take back Zajednice (11AM) while attacking from the dierction of Pozharnice. Find the guns blown in place. 16th Vojv. disengages and retreats down south.
After action report of the 3rd Bosnian Corps beginning 4 June 44:
38th (central column) succeeds in scattering the cetniks along the Celic road.
36th (right column) advance checked by a battalion of SS Regt 27 with the aid from 13 AR.
16th (left column) is repelled and thrown out of Lopare, SS units take Zajednice, Lopare and Priboj.
Damage report on the German side:
SS I/28 is reduced to 180 men (effective strength). Historian J. Peric now makes the claim that the Handschar division was hobbled by the offensive that it was ever after put on the defensive posture. He claims that the Germans lost 1170 killed in the are around Lopare alone. Nothing was farther from the truth. The inexperienced I/28 was thrown out of its position with stragglers heading north on all roads but makes no mention of the counterattack by II/28.
*Bernwald estimates the strength of 7./AR 13 at 80 men with 4 guns

Speaking of his service with this regiment, a former artillerymen recollected:

“I was a gunner, during the world war I had fired millions or shells it seems. I did this for three years but never went into combat with a rifle in hand. There were times when we lost our guns and were lucky to escape with our lives.” R.S.

The views of Imam Halim Malkoc – Summer 1944

“It is a sad reality that the number of deserters from our division is not small. Even worse is the fact that these deserters are going into the ranks of our worst enemy, the communists. You imams have to prevent that. You have to be in constant contact with your soldiers and be refreshing their morale. The groundwork of our work and survival is collabotarion with the Germans.” – 6. July.
The famous imam also had some controversial views on the sworn enemy of his countrymen, the chetniks. Views that likely only he shared:
“The Chetniks as a nationalistic element are inherently anti-Bolshevik. In the struggle against Bolschevism we have to use all possible options. We would be committing a criminal act against European culture if we had rejected their support. The condition of the troops and the situation does not look favorable at the first glance. The troops must never have doubts in our ultimate victory, nor lose hope in the leadership.”

There were many who disagreed. For one thing there were many former chetniks who were now serving in the partisans. Their double motives could not be trusted. And if not ironic, or tragic enough, those Bosniaken that did desert/defect to the partisans would be joining an ever increasing population of amnesty seeking domobrans, ustashas and chetniks. Another paradox was the mentality of the men in October of 1944 when the order to move out of Bosnia was given. As far as they were concerned the deal was to fight local partisans not Russians for the safety of the German Reich

A note on the factors influencing Desertions:

*The manpower of the Handschar division was being sapped by many factors in the latter months of the year 1944. The Croat government had become hostile to it and began enticing its members to back out of its ranks. The German alliance with the Chetniks was turning away many of the Muslims and this coupled with Tito’s promise of amnesty gave the men of the Handschar division a means of staying in Bosnia and securing their own villages under a different flag. Likewise the Bosnians saw no sense in leaving their own country to defend the Reich against the Soviets. It must be noted that the faith and the motives of the partisans was shaken during the year too. Around 200 members of the 16th Muslim Bde (partisan) defected to the Handschar division (their total strength was 450).

 

War Crimes Allegations and Other Myths

I – Claims of War Crimes in the Bosut Forest

“I remember well when the ones with the fezzes came. They came from Shid, over Vasica, and then by rail to Gradina and then they continued onto Spachva. All of the village inhabitants were rounded up in one place. The SS men then searched the houses, no one was killed and nothing was burned. Only those found hiding in the woods were shot on the spot. The village of Batrovci was only burned in 1945” J.P. (from Batrovci)
The post war commission claimed that 20 were killed in Batrovci. Atankovic says 230 and Mickovic: 70. A range of 20 to 230, while eye witnesses say no one was killed at all.

“The partisans in Srem were fleeing before us. Regarding the civilian population, our orders were: search everything because the partisans hide not only in the woods but also in the basements and attics. Those who were not hiding were not harmed. We did however run into armed individuals that tried to resist us. In those cases they were dealt with accordingly.”
Hasan M. (SS man from Vlasenica)
“In the village of Grk, no one died and nothing was burned”

– Serb historian Vasic/British observer Davidson
Again the commission disagrees and claims 15 were killed.

“The village of Bosut was taken during combat. I can’t tell for others, but I had the luck not to be hit. For me and others those were my first firefights. I was only 18.”

– M.N. – pionier
There were specific accusations made against members of the pionier abteilung. The partisans blamed them for intentionally blowing up the dams to cause flooding in the area. They claim that 10 men took it upon themselves to do this, hinting at the deniability of such an act. There were also accusations of pioniers with flamethrowers burning civilians to death in their homes. The worst accusations were reserved for the Albanians of I/28. Interestingly these were corroborated both by the Bosnians and the Germans and may account for the allegations against the Division by the partisans in the Srem region.

II – Attributing Chetnik crimes to the 13th SS Division

“It was then that the chetniks were in Dragoljevac and were conducting mass arrests, focusing first on the NOP activists and then everyone else. They tortured them in the prisons, raped the girls and condemned others to death.” – Miljanovic
J. Peric instead blames the SS and attributes 60 killed in Dragoljevac. Interestingly enough, all of the accusations laid against members of the 13th Division were used again at the trial of chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic. The commission blamed Handschar for the deaths of a 140 civilians in Donja Trnova, along with a 150-300 partisan wounded. M.Gen. Dragic bloated this figure to 800 partisans. Milos Zekic, the commander of the 38th Div. rightfully attributed the killing of the wounded to the chetniks.

III – Confusing the Domobrans for Handschar

The red fezzes of the Muslim Domobrans and/or Ustasas have often been confused for those of the Handschar division. So much so that events years prior to the formation of the Handschar division have been attributed to the 13th SS. The massacre at Koritska Gorge (1941) for example has been attributed to Handschar by Serb historian Vladimir Dedijer. Though it should be noted that the only Bosnians convicted for war crimes were not convicted for anything done while with the Handschar division but from the days in the Ustasa or other NDH formations.

IV – Plunder
“One of our people had found a piece of beef in one of the abandoned houses, and although our rations were sufficient we decided to keep it. When we arrived in our base camp, we passed by SS-Hstuf. Driesner, who began yelling at us and calling us plunderers, also threatened a court martial. Therefore we had to part with the meat.”

– recollections of an SS man from I/28
V Strafkompanie (Punishment Company) – von Kozewar

The primary membership of this unit were those SS men that violated the rules, regulations and the general code of conduct. The unit was meant to be only a company in size but grew to the size of a small battalion (~320). They were subordinated to the pionier abteilung for physical labor, to include the setting of mines and obstacles. Among the were offenders was one man who sold a kettenkrad to the Chetniks, another who shot his squad leader and had his death sentence commuted. There were however also many more who were deemed physically unfit for combat duty after sustaining heavier wounds. Therefore the majority were Bosnians in ethnicity.

Other famous myths
1. “The Handzar is a knife specially designed for slitting throats and was issued to all members.” (- a possible reference to “Srbosijek”). No such edged weapon ever existed or was issued.
2. Myths concerning the mutiny:
A) “It was the first SS unit to mutiny.” This one is simply bad research. The 7th SS mutinied weeks prior to the 13th Div., when 170 men refused to take up arms (incident of 30 Aug 1943).
B) “An English agent instigated the mutiny.” There exist no British documents confirming this one.
C) “A 150 division members were executed” Philip J. Cohen ” Serbia’s Secret War:Propaganda and the Deceit of History. The real number was 14.
D) “A large portion of the division was engaged in the mutiny.” Quite to the contrary, the mutiny occurred only in a single company of a small engineer battalion. None of the Infantry Regiments were even affected. The scale of the mutiny was unknown to even the members of the division. Upon arrival rumors abounded to the Roman style decimation of the ranks as a punishment. Some even claimed every 3rd man was sent to Dachau or executed.
3. “Each division member had the SS runes tattooed on his right hand.” Easily proven wrong.
4. “Recent president of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic was an SS officer.”
5. “10,000 surviving members of the Division were executed and thrown into a mineshaft near Trbovlje” This one came out of someone’s wishful fantasy, Kpfgpe Hanke did not number anywhere close to 10,000 men. Around 3,000 Bosniaks evaded captivity and were situated in a POW camp in N. Italy.

6. Handschar wasn’t the largest SS Division…simply because it broke 21,000 (a few online sources claim otherwise). Prinz Eugen, Galicia and Hitlerjugend all numbered 21,000+ at some point.

The Return

 

Events of 22 feb. 1944 – April 1944

“Immediately upon disembarking from the trains, the troops fell to the ground and kissed the earth beneath them. The NCOs tried to stop them but Sauberzweig insisted otherwise, saying: “You are not aware of how much they love their homeland.” – Ibrahimovic

Handschar Division’s return was first reported by the partisans on 22.II.44 as this 16. Vojv. Div report states:

“A unit of (SS) troops arrived here recently. They come wearing green fezzes with a death’ s head on them, officers are German.”

Unternehmen Wegweiser 10.III.1944

Op. Sign Post was Sauberzweig’s tactical masterpiece in some ways. He positioned the division on the enemy’s northern, western and eastern flanks and then quickly decreased that perimeter. He used the river Sava to the south as a natural obstacle which he did not expect the partisans to cross. To ensure this, a gun boat named “Bosnia” was patrolling the river to prevent the enemy’s escape. It was not until Op. Maypole that he would use the division on such a scale.

(post war partisan map showing the withdrawal across the Sava river)

“The partisans were in retreat, often 5-6km ahead of us. They ran like rabbits whenever the MG42 fired.” – SS-Stz. Alija Ivojevic

Massive flooding seems to have made the partisans seek higher ground, but it did have the effect of making the roads muddier for the German troops. This fact was later used by the partisans accusing a handful of pioniers of blowing up the dams and causing the flooding themselves.

There are conflicting accounts on the movements of the partisan forces during Op. Sign Post. In some accounts they were virtually squeezed from three flanks allowing only one southerly direction of movement across the Sava and into Bosnia, however other reports seem to indicate that a few detachments moved back into the forest with Handschar’s departure, neccesitating German security troops to mop up the remnants. The 13th Artillery Regiment also seems to have been busy shelling villages north of the Sava from the Bosnian side.

Unternehmen Sava 15.III.1944

Above: movement from Op. Wegweiser into the crossing (Op. Sava).

A pioneer shares his memory of crossing the Sava over to Bosanska Racha:

“I was wounded then trying to obscure the movement of our maneuver element with smoke. A shell hit near me and threw me back.” – M.N. Pionier 14. March ‘44

“We were proper soldiers. The next morning at formation, our commander greeted us with “Heil Schutzstaffel!” to which we replied Heil Hitler! The Germans had taught us everything that was important in combat. How to wage war and how to keep safe while at it, everything a soldier needed to know, everything from the needle to the cannon. In those days we were truly well armed. Whenever the “marketenderware” (commissary) came around we were able to purchase all those things that were usually scarce (for a civilian).” A.A

Ambush at Brezovo Polje 15.III.1944

The lead elements of the division were met by a company sized ambush at Brezovo Polje. The SS men simply reorganized and doggedly advanced towards Bijeljina. The partisan company simply pulled back to its parent battalion. The 16. Vojv. Div diary nonetheless tells of a reckless German charge countered by the partisans with ground changing 2-3 times before the partisan company had to finally withdraw, leaving the SS unit badly bruised and beaten (the SS unit in question may have been the Albanian battalion). Elsewhere, the 6th Co. 28th Regt crosses the Sava, reports 7 partisans KIA and the enemy leaving the woods in front of them.

Aufkl. Abt 13 and the lead elements of II/28 advanced rapidly southward toward Celic coming within 20km of 16th Vojv. HQ. At Koraj the recon troops find the enemy dug in and are forced to return fire, eventually calling in mortars and artillery on the entire village. The partisan ultimately leave with 36 dead and 60 wounded (here the Serb historian Sogic boasts of 350 SS men killed or wounded with 50 partisan dead, 82 WIA and 41 MIA. If we take his claim seriously it would mean that both Aufkl. Abt. 13 and II/28 were seriously hobbled by this little skirmish).

*Partisan supply problems leave some men with only 4-5 rounds of ammunition.

A member of the Division recollected on the first days of combat and the first casualties:

“We carried our first six fallen comrades for two hours to a cemetary in a nearby Muslim village. There we dug the graves and invited a cleric. The imam (division imam?) taught us not to wash the bodies of the shaheeds, but only to remove their boots. Soon our battalion commander arrived at the scene. Our platoon commander was a German and could not understand our language. Unlike other Germans he observed our customs with curiosity and respect. I found myself next to him in combat and despite the dust and cacophany of battle you could still hear the murmuring of “eshehedu…” He noticed this, looked at me but said nothing. Later when things calmed down, he asked me what it all meant. I simply answered that was our religious obligation when death was near. At the funeral, he stood off on the side with the other Germans and while others were impatiently waiting for the ceremony to be over, he listened and watched the rituals unfold. As we expressed our final farewells we formed up in line behind the imams (as was the custom). After which we fired off our salutes (by three platoons – squads?). The Germans (officers) extended their arms in the usual salute. Still in formation, we continued on. My platoon commander came to by side and said to himself: “a proper warrior’s religion.” Overhearing this I asked: “Why do you say that?
“You form up like soldiers even when addressing God.”
Until then I did not give it much thought to the impression made by our ranks, ranks of men standing shoulder to shoulder in which could not exist empty spaces.”

The Partisans take Notice 

“The enemy has taken Bijeljina, fierce battles on the line between Celic – Koraj – Zabrde – Janja. Positions are passing into their hands. The enemy is sustaining heavy casualties (questionable). The enemy is terrorizing the countryside, killing women, children and looking for the bases where our wounded are. The losses for the 16th and 36th Divs are 300 ‘thrown out of ranks‘. Lack of ammunition. Positions at Celic-Koraj had to be abandoned due to heavy artillery and mortar fire (confirmed by the German account).”

Another partisan report promising to hold Handschar out of the Majevicas:

“The BH SS Division number 13 that launched an offensive on our units from the 14th of the last month, has, according to our sources, completed a concentration of its troops (25,000-30,000) in the sector of Bijeljina – Celic – Brcko. Our task: Keep the Majevica sector until as long as possible and frustrating the enemy’s advance or containing him on the Tuzla-Brcko line.”

20. March – “take all measures to protect the hospitals and supply bases.”
23.-26. March – “snowing” – a 40 man patrol out of Ratkovici runs into heavy partisan fire, calls in artillery to deal with it.
24. March – The division maintains its momentum by sending recon companies south.
26. March – SS units launch surprise attacks in bad weather:
– 2 companies of partisans attacked at Donji Zovik.
– a partisan battalion at Gornji Rahic is also attacked.
– Vrazice is attacked by the SS.
28.-29. March – nothing.
30. March – a reconnaissance in force (100 SS men) run into a partisan battalion, dispersing them with arty and mortars.

Having been thrown out of Gornji Rahic, the commander of III/36 reports an absurd casualty figure of 8 killed, 2 captured 57 wounded and 68 missing, claiming to have killed 70 and wounded 40 SS men. The Germans counted 124 partisan dead and 14 captured. The dead+missing partisan figure refers to all of the partisan dead counted by the German forces. Serb historian Sogic claims that in the three day period of 15.-18. March: around 350 SS killed/wounded, with an additional 70 dead, 40 wounded on 26. March. His colleagues Marinovic and Rebula give a wilder claim of 2,000 dead/wounded on 18. March alone. Peric gives the lowest estimate at 250 killed/wounded. Which is still a range of 250-2000. For the Battle of Lopare, Peric claims 400 dead, 778 wounded. Actual German records admit a loss that is slightly half that estimate, 250 dead, 528 wounded. All in all the highest claim for the March-June period is 2,750 killed/wounded, the lowest 1070.

For this period, Partisan unit diaries are filled with bogus surprise attacks on SS positions in which they completely rout the Bosnians. Jeremiah Peric – the perpetrator of the Srbosjek myth claims 2,000 casualties in the 5 days fighting at the foothills of the Majevicas for the 13th SS. Despite there only being 2 battalions of SS men committed to the fight. His colleagues claim the fighting went on 2 for weeks, when in reality the partisans could not sustain themselves on the defensive for longer than 5 days. Another 3rd Corps (partisan) report claims: 1100 SS men unfit for duty after the fighting. This would mean the entire II/28 being destroyed as a fighting formation.

Unternehmen Osterei 12.IV.1944

Following Unternhemen Osterei (12. April) the division continued its deliberate southward advance to the Majevicas. By mid April Aufkl. Abt 13 had already scouted out the western foothills of the Majevicas and made contact with the 1st Domobran (Home Guard) Mountain Detachment. By 20. April, the partisans exhausted from previous battles, evacuate 200 of their wounded and leave the Majevicas.

In a 28 April communique at 1630 Danilo Lekic to 16th and 36th Divs. discretely admits to the need for forceful foraging of food if operations are to continue.
“If we aim to continue resisting the advance of the 28th Regt.13 SS Division, we have to requisition food and livestock to support operations.”
The partisans therefore chose a softer target and resolve to attack the Domobran and Green Cadre units in the villages of Jajice, Memici, Kalesija, Prnjavor, Miljanovice, Rajnice Lipovice, Gornje Petrovice and Medjas. The villages are plundered for food and livestock, where an “energetic collection of food and livestock takes place.” The spring offensives against the Handschar division had exposed the weakness of partisan logistics. The winter prior to the arrival of the SS division, the two divisions had been largely concerned with providing food to their troops. Footwear was also in short supply.
The fact that the partisans would attack neutral Muslim villages confirms the accounts of Handschar men and the heavy handed nature of the communists.

 

The Bigger Picture

From Villefranche to St. Veit and Captivity:

The Division began its training in S. France (early July 1943) and departed for Neuhammer on 1. October 1943 (strength: 21,065 officers and men). It began leaving the training grounds in mid Feb. 44 and arrived in Srem in preparations for Unt. Wegweiser (its first operation). The crossing into Bosnia over the Sava river was conducted via Unt. Sava on 15. Mar. 44.

Between then and the end of Unt. Maibaum (the war’s largest partisan sweep), the Division lost 1,900 men, most of these when the Albanian battalion left the Division (approx 1,400 men). The casualties and desertions therefore add up to 500 men. Between the months of March and August 1944 alone, the partisans in Yugoslavia suffered about 9% of their fatalities for the year when facing the 13th SS Div. (6,720 counted dead, excludes 3766 estimated additional dead). Of the 5,600 partisans that went missing that year, about 32% were captured by the Handschar division. The civilian situation was far more telling. By the end of the year 1944, 208,000 civilians were made refugees by the fighting in eastern Bosnia. About 80,000 had fathers and brothers in the 13th Division. In fact the Bosniak ethnic group fared the worst proportionally in Yugoslavia. The total civilian dead was 75,000 dead (8% of the total population, higher than the Serbs at 7.3% and second only to the Jews and Gypsies).

The division began its withdrawal from Bosnia on 16. Oct. 1944. Some of its combat units took up positions on the Danube bridgeheads and briefly held off the Russians in the mid-to late month of November. The division consolidated on the Margarethestellung (south-west of Lake Balaton, Hungary) on 2. Dec. 1944 and remained there for the winter until 1. Apr. 1945. The retreat to Greater Germany began shortly thereafter ending with surrender at St. Veit an Der Glan on 12. May 1945. The battlegroup numbered approx. 7,000 by this point and was moved to an Allied POW camp in Rimini Italy. About 3,000 Bosnians remained with this group.

“Schwesterdivisionen”

By 1944, Himmler’s continued plans for the expansion of his W-SS formation in the Balkans were too optimistic to be taken seriously. Manpower pools were drying up and the willingness of the volunteers dropped with each kilometer the Soviets advanced westward. In most cases the divisions he intended to raise never rose above brigade strength, nor achieved the combat proficiency of the divisions raised and trained in 1943. They were often marred with desertions and mutinies.

Skanderbeg

The first of these expansions was to be the 21st SS-Skanderbeg division, to be formed from Handschar’s I/28 battalion (1,400 men). The Albanians belonging to I/28 began their training with the Bosnians in S. France (albeit at separate training sites) and later went into action with the rest of the 13th SS during operations Wegweiser, Sava and Osterei where they performed commendably. According to some sources the Albanians were awarded their last Iron Crosses while in Bosnia. Both the Germans and the Bosnians however noted the Albanians’ lack of discipline and brutality towards the civilian population. The one damning piece of testimony that has forever tarnished their reputation was that of Standartenfuhrer Franz Mattheis given 11 Sept 1946 in front of a Yugoslav tribunal.
“On this march these people beheaded everything they found, whatever didnt wear a fez. There were instances where if an officer marching at the head of column saw farmers working in a field, next time he’d turn around he couldnt expect to see them alive. Shiptars would normally get out of the column and start killing them.”

(above: one of those Albanians from I/28 after transfer to Albania, a drop in discipline can be noted. The camouflage smock issued at Neuhammer identifies him as one of the 1943 volunteers)

Their div. commander August Schmidhuber was far less flattering about their performance as soldiers:
“The courage and heroism of the Albanian is another myth. You can more or less chase an Albanian around the globe with a light mortar. While on the attack, he will only go so far, up to where he can find something to steal or plunder. Once he has captured a goat, a ploughshare or the wheel of a sewing machine, the war is over for him and he goes home.”
Schmidhuber does however exclude the “battalion from Handschar” from his analysis as the only unit he could depend on. Wehrmacht observers did note that the Reichsdeutsche in Albania made virtually no effort whatsoever to learn the language or customs so as to better understand their men (a lack of Volksdeutsche to bridge the gap may have been lacking). Schmidhuber later claimed that the September mutinies at Tetovo and Gostivar were unwarranted since in his words the Albanians were well treated there. By the middle of October he could muster only 86 officers, 467 NCOs and only 899 enlisted men (half of which were Germans). On the 1st of November 1944, Skanderbeg was disbanded, its remnants were augmented with Kriegsmarine personnel and put within the folds of the 7th SS Division. They advanced back up north and re-traced their steps through the Bosnian towns of Zvornik, Bijeljina and Brcko where they had originally crossed in mid March. The battlegroup was eventually disbanded in February of 1945, consisting mostly of Kriegsmarine personnel by that point.

Kama

The loss of I/28 cost Handschar approx 1/5th of its total combat strength (infantry). Still, Himmler wanted “a second Croatian division.” What this meant was a promotion for Sauberzweig and the transfer of 54 officers, 187 NCOs and 1,137 enlisted men out of the Handschar division on 23 June 1944.

The formation of Kama and Batschka seems to have been done so haphazardly that the recruits had not been “broken in” for discipline. Recruits of the Handschar division had ample time to learn commands in both languages as well as to familiarize themselves with German culture (considering they trained in Germany). The language barrier in the Kama division seems to have been more severe.

A certain Untersturmfuhrer “Willier” recalled one incident in which he had difficulty having his orders followed. The circumstance arose from a lack of food, the Untersturmfuhrer then suggested that his men simply eat the corn they could acquire along the way. Offended and speaking out of protest, his translator Alija told him they would only do so if he had first engaged in the activity himself. Seeing no other option, Willier had to commit, and only then was he obeyed.

Three months after its formation the division could only muster 126 officers, 374 NCOs and 3,293 men. With the Soviets nearing their training sites, what combat ready troops there were (2,600) were thrown into action on the Thiess river (Batschka region, Hungary) at Stari Becej against the 3rd Ukrainian Front on 7-9 Oct. 1944. They were deployed there as a part of Kpfgpe. Syr along with combat ready units of the Batschka division (Volksdeutsche). A short time after that the men of the Kama division mutinied (17. Oct). By the month’s end (31. Oct) the entire unit was disbanded. The Germans personnel were sent to the Batschka division and the Bosnians to Handschar. Its replacement battalion was also handed over to the Karstjager division (itself low on manpower).

The Gulaschkannone and other musings

an officer stands by to taste the stew at a field kitchen – Spring 1944

Nicknamed the goulash-cannon because of the smoke stack located off to the side of the main cooking chamber, these field kitchens existed prior to WW1 in the same style and could feed a company of men at a time.

Nicknames and Greetings 

Mujo (moo-yoh): – a common Muslim Bosnian name that came to mean any Bosniak member of the Division. Mujos in plural, usually used by the Reichsdeutsche to refer to the native majority.

Banden/Banditen:  a German term for partisan.

Flintenweib – a female partisan (of which there seems to have been many)

Terms used by partisans to refer to the Handschar Division:

“Be Ha SS Divizija” (phonetic B.H.)

Hrvatska SS Divizija (due to the chessboard arm patches)

“Fesarosi” in the Srem regions (meaning “those wearing fezzes”)

“Esesovci” – trans. SS men

“SS Blue Division” or “plave kicanke” – (Blue Division/blue tassels) – referred to by this name by the partisans of the 38th Div.

Greetings:

Company Commander: “Heil company!”

Enlisted men/NCOs: “Heil mein Fuhrer!”

One last photo study:

The NCO on the left wears the sigrunes beneath the left breast pocket to signify his status as a full “SS member.” The Sturmmann on the right (Nazir Hodzic – squad leader 6th Co/28th Regt) wears a black wound badge (having been wounded once or twice by that point) and the ribbon for the EKII. Muslim members of the W-SS seem to have neglected to wear the Iron Cross itself (especially the Imams). Some even went so far as to remove the Schachbrett arm patch (it is only rumored to have happened).

We dont know of any Handschar members that went to the mountain leader’s course. The “Bergfuhrer” badge was only issued in X.1944 when few men could be spared for the course or care to wear additional badges at a time when most of them had combat experience of mountain warfare.

 

 

Addendum 1943-45

“He who does not have his own flag is obliged to fight for another’s” – Unknown

The following will be a more intimate look at the 13th SS Division (and in many cases its sister divisions) through the many anecdotes, myths, facts, statistics and general trivia known to us so far. The preceeding “manuscript” left out much including a good time-line of events post November 1944. This attempt will however still be written in brevity to avoid redundancy.

1943 – Recruitment, Training in France and Germany 

“Ko nema šta jest,
Neka ide u eses
Pa će dobiti zeleni fes
i svašta će jest!”

The idea of a division consisting of Bosnians had been first raised when the 7th SS was being organized. One source later boasted that a 100,000 volunteers could have been found in 1941, as opposed to only 20,000 in 1943. Which was not far off its mark since Bosniaks enlisted in all three of the legionary Wehrmacht divisions raised in Croatia and were amongst the ill-fated 369th Infanterie Regiment (~1,500) that perished at Stalingrad (these units were raised prior to Handschar, Kama, Batschka or Skanderbeg).

The Waffen SS first made its impression on the Bosnians with the arrival of the division Prinz Eugen to eastern Bosnia, a region where the communists and Chetniks routinely victimized the Bosniaks and the Croats. Their primary means of self defense in those parts was the infamous Black Legion. To make matters worse, Arthur Phleps did not have the cooperation of the Italians in the area and would often be forced to threaten them with Stukas in order to get compliance. As to the chetniks, he considered them neither friends nor enemies but a threat that should be disarmed at any opportunity.

“When we found out that the Bosnians would be allowed into German service many took the opportunity. In Bosnia existed a nostalgic reverence towards the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. With that we felt a connection to the German Reich. To us Germany stood for cleanliness, order and discipline. Of the Jews and the concentration camps we knew nothing.”                                                                  – Imam Ibrahimovic

“The greater majority of us did not know what the SS was, or that it was elite. I originally thought that the two letters stood as acronyms of a particular unit, but they later told us that this was the German army for foreigners. Prior to this I was in the Domobrans. In one particular case we were saved from sure defeat by the arrival of the Germans. I had no desire to go back to the Domobrans after that. So I went into the SS. Like others then I never heard anything about the concentration camps in Germany where they were killing masses of people. We knew of the camps at Jasenovac and Gradiska because the Ustasa were openly talking about them and also threatening anyone with them.”

Optimism was voiced at the highest levels:

“I’m sticking by my decision to raise a Muslim SS division,the Bosniaken as a people are currently neither fighting with us or against us, but I am certain that the Bosniaken would make loyal soldiers if brought to our side.                                 – H.Himmler

Arrival in France

Villefranche-de-Rouergue today. Many of the volunteers were smitten by its similarity to Sarajevo. None better described this first impression than Fadil Ekmecic

“Regardless of the approach, one had the impression that he was entering Bosnia. On the road were plum trees, walnuts and the scattered flocks of sheep. There were roads that snaked around, rose and descended as they went, no wider than those we had in Bosnia. No city in southern Rouergueu wasnt as attractive like Villefrance was on its approach. We Bosnians descended down upon the city from the direction of Rodez and had the feeling that we were coming up on the Bascarsija (famous square in Sarajevo). Villefranche is an old city with streets no wider than one’s arm span, and somewhere even narrower. There were three schools into which the pioneers were situated.”

Training/Initial impressions

The initial impression made on the transferred SS trainers was not a positive one. The candidates for the first officer/NCO course held in the Spring of 1943, most of whom only had paramilitary training and experience of the Ustasas or the Domobrans, were found lacking in organizational skills. Their performance with heavy weapons such as mortars was also dubious. A Reichsdeutsche officer pointed out that the language barrier seemed to be more pronounced in this division than in any others (up to that point). The Volksdeutsche (Germans born outside of the Reich) were found useful in this regard since many spoke the language of the Bosnians. Even Himmler later observed the bi-lingual nature of the division (The Division’s newspaper was also written in both languages). As later events would prove, these issues were only initial assessments and did not predict the division’s performance.

*eventhough this was Vichy France, these soldiers-in-training were still put on guard duty and often armed with only 15 rounds of rifle ammunition.

Mutiny of 17.IX.43

Speaking much later on the topic of supposed English interference in the mutiny, one of the division’s translators said:
“Dzanic lied and fooled his Bosniaks with the fairy tale of English help! How could he in a span of less than 6 weeks come into contact with the English and form a plan for a division wide mutiny? A division which was spread across 60km in various places..”

– Z. Bernwald

(Bernwald was of the opinion that the mutineers had not fully comprehended the futility of their actions. Even if Villefranche was liberated he said, Hitler would’ve simply sent 10 Stukas to level the place.)

A third party observer watching the action in the streets was a French WW1 veteran, who either jokingly or in a confused manner noted that:

“these Germans are shooting at each other now.”

Bajram 1943 (Speech-making and gift-giving)

“Much happened on the first day of Ramazan Bajram. Division commander held a talk in front of all of the troops and wished them a happy Bajram and then said: On behalf of Heinrich Himmler and myself, I extend my personal commendations to imam Halim Malkoc and all imams of the division Handschar. Upon Malkoc I bestow the rank of Hauptsturmfuhrer and the Iron Cross 1st class. The other imams likewise will receive promotions in rank as a true mark of their soldierly capabilities. In the future, the imams will be referred to as “sonderfuhrers.”

“You Bosnian Muslims have experienced the Serbian terror, the British agents have not only allowed such evil acts to occur but encouraged the merciless policy, not only that but both Russia and England have promised their support.” – Husseini

Acting division imam Husein Djozo thanked Himmler for his donations to the family members of the Bosniaken, increasing the troop bread ration, and the establishment of imam school. ” (These deeds) signify the great benevolence for us Muslims and for Bosnia in general. I therefore consider it my duty to extend our thanks to the Reichfuhrer SS in the name of division’ imams as well as in name of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian’s poor in that I pledge that we are prepared to lay down our lives to battle for the great leader Adolf Hitler and the New Europe.”

Inspection by the Mufti – Neuhammer 1943

Franz Rauner, a transferee (from 7th SS) was instructed to form the much photographed honor guard in anticipation of the Mufti’s visit.

“We will be visited by the Grossmufti and the Reichsfuhrer of the SS. In preparation for their arrival I want you to put together an honor guard detail. You have two months times to train them up.” Sauberzweig to Rauner  (form. 7th SS)
“I requested half of (every?) working day for the training of the platoon and was approved. We began drilling immediately. I told the soldiers who would be coming for a visit, how we were to be filmed for the news and that they should make the effort to show what Bosnians are capable of. They were therefore highly motivated and drilled smartly.”

Franz later said:
“Bosnians were exceptionally good soldiers. In the thick of the fighting they asked for neither bread nor ammunition(ie. they wanted for nothing). They had trained well.”

In their early estimations of what the division was to become, some had predicted that the Bosniaks were not Prussians and “that those trying to make them into Prussians were in for trouble.” Those initial impressions were proving to be wrong. (Neuhammer sits in Silesia, the location of Frederick the Great’s first conquest of 1740, the symbolism was more than subtle in this case).

*many original Waffen SS members had low opinions of the Volunteer SS in general. The 7th SS was once described as a “pig sty”, but the descriptions of the performance of the original SS-VT (by the Wehrmacht) were equally disapproving. (Handschar was a unique case however, the Reichsdeutsche made little to no effort to learn the language and often resented the Volksdeutsche for speaking their native language with the Bosnians).

Back in Bosnia:

The relief effort was extensive, with even the division members pitching in 88,000 Rms. Reichfuhrer himself contributes 250,000 Rms. Husseini also makes a contribution to the Merhamet foundation. On Feb 14th 1944, Gottlob Berger suggests each family member of an SS member recieves:6 kilos of flower, 150g butter, 200g sugar, 200g salt, 200g “tjestenima” and 500g beans/vegetables. By comparison the average German citizen in 1945 could rely on a ration of only 125g butter, 250g meat and 1700g bread. However with 208,000 refugees coming out of eastern Bosnia, and the fact that around 80,000 had a family member serving in the SS, the initiative was a sound investment and likely improved morale and trust between the Bosnians and the Germans.
The local politics were beginning to focus more on the Bosniaks as an element critical to a victory in the region. In September of 1943, the partisans raised the 16th Muslim Bde. (peak strength 450, fought against the 14th SS Regt – summer 44). This unit would later occupy vacated cities and villages left by the 13th Div. and would even receive some of its deserters, thus completing the cycle.
That November the Bosniaks began campaigning for their autonomy from Croat rule. Prof. Nesad Topcic, Muhamed Pandza of Sarajevo were among the loudest voices.

 

The Division’s Newspaper – Handschar

Early on during the training in France, editions of the division newspaper were being published. This was the aptly named “Handzar.” The overwhelming Bosniak majority was represented in all but the name/designation of the division itself. Fadil Sirce often argued with the Croats about the true identity of the division especially on the day the unit designation changed from “13-SS-Frw-b.h.Div” to “1st Croatian.”The Croat schachbrett would come later still.

The division magazine “Handzar” made frequent entries mentioning the WW1 Bosnian regiments as well as amusing anecdotes regarding the old Prussian king. The magazine was a bicultural publication with German entries being translated into Bosnian and vice versa. They were reminded of their Prussian past, the Bosniak lancers and the great benevolence of the Prussian monarch and his tolerance of all religions:
“All religions must be tolerated and the crown must ensure that none is detrimental to the other, for each must be allowed to worship in their own way.” Furthermore, he said: “All religions are equal and good when the people who profess them are honest people; and should Turks and heathens come to populate the land, then we shall endeavor to build mosques and churches for them.”
– Iron Kingdom – Christopher Clarke pp. 252-3

One amusing story that was featured tells of the interaction between Frederick II and one of his palace guards. Confused as to why a servant had not come to his quarters when called for, Fritz ventured out of his room to talk to a grenadier posted on the doorway. He then asked the grenadier to go and fetch his servant, only to be rebuffed once again. The grenadier politely told him that he could not quit his post without proper relief and asked them king to act as his replacement. Fritz then took up his musket and manned the post until the grenadier returned with his servant. The king found this so amusing that he complimented the soldier upon his return for his devotion and understanding of his duty.

 

The Final Months

Combat after action report of 15. Apr. ’45
“After a heavy artillery barrage the enemy attack in the sector of the 13th SS and 297th Divisions in battalion and up to regimental strength, supported by tanks. The fighting was extremely bitter, some positions changed hands upwards of six times, and losses were bloody on both sides.”
“Our troops, particularly the 13th SS Division “Handschar,” have fought outstandingly well in the face of a vastly superior foe. Despite two enemy breakthroughs, the main battle line is in our hands. The fighting continues. One enemy tank has been destroyed.”

The choice to stay in Bosnia or to fight on for the Germans had split many families apart. Jager Husein Mujkanovic (on the right) was KIA in Hungary sometime in April of that year.

When the official news of the surrender were announced, many Bosnians remaining with the battle group opted to go back south whatever the consequences might’ve been. Many however would join the Germans in the Allied POW camp in Rimini, Italy, and some of those would spend the rest of their lives in exile. The partisans were taking reprisals on the members of the 13th and especially the 7th SS divisions. A couple thousand were rumored to have been murdered in a mineshaft in Slovenia on 24. Apr. but the events simply do not correlate. Some years later the veterans of the 13th Division were joined by former Ustasas (of the Crusader resistence movement) and others unwanted by the Yugoslav government and sent to the Middle East to take part in the 1948 war.

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